

ACROSS MARKETS AND BORDERS

Enterprise, Trade and Leadership with Purpose and Integrity

PART IV | INTERNATIONAL MARKETS AND ENTERPRISE

CHAPTER 14

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Trade, Exchange Rates, Policy and African Economic Transformation

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Abstract

International economics explains why borders alter economic choices even when firms, consumers and technologies are increasingly connected. This chapter develops the trade and open-economy macroeconomic foundations required for rigorous analysis of cross-border exchange and regional integration. It moves from absolute and comparative advantage through Ricardian, factor-endowment, specific-factors, new-trade, heterogeneous-firm and gravity perspectives; then examines gains from trade, distributional adjustment, tariffs, quotas, subsidies, non-tariff measures and industrial policy. The chapter links trade to the balance of payments, capital flows, exchange-rate determination, currency regimes, the policy trilemma, inflation pass-through and external stability. Regional integration is analyzed through trade creation and diversion, economies of scale, optimum-currency-area reasoning, sovereignty, subsidiarity and policy autonomy. AfCFTA and the East African Community anchor the African analysis, while the European Single Market and Brexit provide a comparative global case. Christian moral reasoning evaluates integration by truth, justice, productive stewardship, dignity, local agency and long-term human flourishing rather than by trade volume alone.

Keywords: international economics; comparative advantage; trade policy; exchange rates; balance of payments; regional integration; AfCFTA; East African Community; industrial policy; African economic transformation

Learning Outcomes

Table 14.1. Learning outcomes for Chapter 14.

No.	Learning outcome
1	Define international economics as the study of cross-border allocation, exchange, macroeconomic interdependence and policy, and distinguish country-level economic analysis from firm-level international strategy.
2	Calculate absolute advantage, comparative advantage and opportunity cost in a two-country, two-good model; identify the mutually beneficial range of terms of trade; and explain why productivity leadership does not eliminate the case for specialization.
3	Compare Ricardian, Heckscher-Ohlin, specific-factors, Stolper-Samuelson, new-trade, heterogeneous-firm and gravity perspectives, stating the mechanism, unit of analysis, empirical contribution and principal limitations of each.
4	Analyze static and dynamic gains from trade while distinguishing aggregate national gains from distributional outcomes for workers, owners, consumers, regions and firms.
5	Evaluate tariffs, quotas, subsidies, local-content measures and non-tariff measures using price, quantity, fiscal, distributional and welfare effects, including the logic of effective protection and the special complications of market power and externalities.
6	Critically assess protectionism, infant-industry reasoning, strategic trade policy and modern industrial policy through learning externalities, coordination failures, implementation capacity, rent-seeking, competition, fiscal cost, evidence and exit discipline.
7	Construct and interpret a simplified balance of payments, explain the current-account identity $CA = S - I$, and distinguish an accounting identity from a judgment about whether an external deficit or surplus is sustainable.
8	Calculate nominal and real exchange-rate changes, explain purchasing-power-parity and interest-parity intuition, and identify why exchange rates may deviate persistently from simple parity conditions.
9	Compare fixed, managed and floating exchange-rate regimes and apply the open-economy policy trilemma to monetary autonomy, capital mobility and exchange-rate stability.
10	Explain exchange-rate pass-through, the Marshall-Lerner condition, the J-curve, reserve use, external debt vulnerability and the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy under external shocks.
11	Distinguish preferential arrangements, free trade areas, customs unions, common markets and economic or monetary unions, and apply Vinerian trade-creation and trade-diversion reasoning.
12	Apply optimum-currency-area criteria to monetary cooperation and evaluate the economic costs of giving up exchange-rate and independent monetary-policy instruments.
13	Compare AfCFTA, EAC, ECOWAS, SADC and COMESA as economic integration projects without confusing their economic effects with the legal doctrine reserved for Chapter 19.
14	Assess African regional integration using current evidence on intra-African trade, non-tariff trade costs, regional value chains, industrialization, macroeconomic stability and implementation capacity, distinguishing observed outcomes from model projections.
15	Evaluate how trade, exchange rates and regional integration affect structural transformation, export diversification, firm productivity, jobs, inequality, resilience and local productive capacity.
16	Apply Christian moral reasoning alongside consequentialist, rights-based, justice, capability and communitarian perspectives to trade and integration choices involving distribution, sovereignty, subsidiarity, vulnerable households and intergenerational stewardship.
17	Use the Trade and Regional Integration Stewardship (TRIS) Protocol to formulate and defend an evidence-based policy or business-environment judgment that makes its objectives, mechanisms, distributional effects, constraints and moral boundaries explicit.

Concept Map and Chapter Roadmap




Figure 14.1. International economics as a system of trade-offs.

Source/Note: Author's synthesis. The architecture follows the approved Book Blueprint and connects trade theory, distribution, policy, open-economy macroeconomics and regional integration to structural transformation and moral accountability.

The approved purpose of Chapter 14 is to move from the introductory economic foundations of Chapter 1 into the distinctive problems created by trade across borders, macroeconomic interdependence and regional integration. The immediate hand-off from Chapter 13 is equally important. Chapter 13 established that business and public power require moral accountability; Chapter 14 now asks how policy choices about trade barriers, currencies, regional rules and integration distribute opportunity, adjustment costs and policy authority across households, firms, communities and states. Economic analysis is therefore necessary, but it is not self-validating. A policy can raise aggregate real income while imposing concentrated and persistent losses on particular workers or places, and a regional agreement can lower trade costs while also shifting decision authority away from national institutions.

The chapter proceeds in five connected movements. Sections 14.1-14.4 establish the scope and historical foundations and develop absolute and comparative advantage. Sections 14.5-14.8 deepen trade theory through factor endowments, specific factors, increasing returns, heterogeneous firms and the gravity model. Sections 14.9-14.12 examine gains, distribution, trade policy, political economy and industrial policy. Sections 14.13-14.16 shift to the open economy through the balance of payments, exchange rates, regimes, the policy trilemma and external stability. Sections 14.17-14.22 develop regional integration theory, African institutions, AfCFTA, structural transformation and substantial African and global comparative cases. The final sections integrate faith and moral reasoning, provide the TRIS professional protocol, identify recurring analytical errors, synthesize the chapter and hand the reader to Chapter 15, where the unit of analysis shifts from countries and integration systems to the multinational enterprise.

SCOPE BOUNDARY | What Chapter 14 owns - and what it deliberately leaves to later chapters

Chapter 14 owns international trade theory, the economic effects of trade policy, open-economy macroeconomics, exchange-rate regimes and the economics of regional integration. Chapter 1 introduced only the elementary market logic that this chapter now develops in depth. Chapter 12 owns general strategy; Chapter 15 owns firm-level internationalization, multinational configuration and global strategy; Chapter 16 owns cross-border marketing; Chapter 17 owns corporate foreign-exchange exposure, hedging, trade finance and settlement; Chapter 18 owns investment valuation and portfolio allocation; and Chapter 19 owns trade-law doctrine, legal remedies, disputes, formal policy negotiation and geoeconomic statecraft. Chapter 21 owns sustainability-specific policy and ESG implementation. This chapter may identify those interfaces, but it does not re-teach their specialist tools.

Opening Case: AfCFTA and the Economics of a Continental Market That Does Not Yet Behave Like One

The African Continental Free Trade Area is often described in superlatives. Such language can be useful for communicating ambition, but economics begins with a more demanding question: what mechanism converts a signed agreement into lower real trade costs, new production, higher productivity, better jobs and greater resilience? The distinction matters because formal tariff preferences are only one component of the cost of trading across African borders. A firm that can legally sell duty-free may still face expensive transport, uncertain border processing, incompatible technical requirements, limited trade finance, currency volatility, unreliable energy, weak logistics information and a market too fragmented to justify a new plant.

The evidence reveals both opportunity and constraint. UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports that intra-African trade accounted for about 16% of the continent's total trade in its Economic Development in Africa Report 2024. The same report notes that only 16 of 54 African countries sourced more than 0.5% of intermediate goods regionally, that road transport represented about 29% of the price of goods traded within Africa compared with about 7% for goods traded outside the continent, and that non-tariff measures were estimated to restrict intra-African trade roughly three times more than ordinary customs tariffs. Yet 61% of Africa's regional exports were processed or semi-processed goods, a composition that makes regional trade especially relevant to industrial learning and value addition (UNCTAD, 2025). These figures draw on different underlying years and methodologies; they should therefore be read as structural signals rather than as a single contemporaneous dashboard.

More recent trade-value evidence shows movement without proving causation. Afreximbank estimated intra-African trade at US\$220.3 billion in 2024, up 12.4% from 2023, although its share of total African trade eased slightly to 14.4% as total merchandise trade also rebounded (African Export-Import Bank, 2025). The increase is consistent with expanding regional

exchange, but it cannot by itself establish how much was caused by AfCFTA implementation rather than commodity prices, macroeconomic recovery, bilateral changes or pre-existing regional arrangements. A well-designed evaluation needs a counterfactual, which is why model-based forecasts and causal empirical studies are useful but must be interpreted within their assumptions.

The World Bank's 2022 AfCFTA modeling illustrates this distinction. Under a scenario that assumes substantial implementation of the trade agreement together with investment and competition reforms, the Bank estimated that regional incomes could be up to 9% higher by 2035 than under its baseline, with almost 18 million additional jobs and up to 50 million people potentially exiting extreme poverty. Female wages were projected to rise by 11.2% relative to the baseline, compared with 9.8% for men (Echandi et al., 2022). These are conditional simulation results, not observed achievements or promises. Their value lies in clarifying mechanisms and magnitudes under stated assumptions. Their danger lies in being repeated as if the projected future had already occurred.

Table 14.2. AfCFTA opening-case signals: what the evidence shows and what it does not.

Evidence signal	Reported value or finding	What it can support	What it cannot establish
Intra-African trade share	About 16% of Africa's total trade in the UNCTAD structural assessment	Regional trade remains a minority of Africa's total trade and there is substantial room for deeper continental exchange.	That a particular target share is economically optimal, or that low shares are caused by tariffs alone.
Intra-African trade value	US\$220.3bn in 2024; +12.4% year on year (Afreximbank estimate)	Regional trade value rebounded strongly in 2024.	That AfCFTA alone caused the rebound, or that trade volume rose by the same percentage.
Road transport burden	About 29% of the price of goods traded within Africa in the cited UNCTAD evidence	Infrastructure and logistics can dominate formal tariff costs.	That every corridor, product or shipment faces the same cost structure.
Non-tariff measures	Estimated to restrict intra-African trade about three times more than tariffs	Standards, procedures and administrative frictions can materially constrain trade.	That all non-tariff measures are illegitimate; many pursue valid health, safety or environmental objectives.
Regional export composition	61% processed or semi-processed in the cited UNCTAD evidence	Regional markets can be important for value-added production and learning.	That processing automatically means high productivity, high wages or globally competitive firms.
World Bank AfCFTA scenario	Up to +9% regional income by 2035; almost 18m jobs; up to 50m fewer people in extreme poverty	A quantified conditional scenario of possible gains from deep implementation.	An observed outcome, guaranteed forecast or distribution-free welfare gain.

Sources/Notes: African Export-Import Bank (2025); Echandi et al. (2022); UNCTAD (2025). Values are reported or modeled at different dates and should not be combined as if measured on a common base.

EVIDENCE CHECK | An agreement is not an outcome

Treat the AfCFTA as an institutional input into an economic mechanism. Tariff preferences can change relative prices, but realized effects depend on utilization, rules of origin, customs and standards implementation, infrastructure, productive capacity, finance, macroeconomic stability, firm entry and adjustment. A serious analyst therefore tracks intermediate mechanisms as well as headline trade values.

The case gives Chapter 14 its central problem: How can countries capture the real gains from international exchange and regional integration while managing adjustment, external vulnerability, policy constraints and the moral responsibilities created by unequal power and unequal exposure to economic change?

14.1 Why International Economics and Regional Integration Matter

International economics studies what changes when economic activity crosses political borders. The core questions are familiar - what is produced, who consumes it, how prices coordinate exchange, how resources move and how policy affects incentives - but borders add currencies, trade costs, jurisdictional differences, distinct macroeconomic policies and multiple political communities. A domestic transaction can be taxed, financed and settled under one legal and monetary system. An international transaction may combine a tariff preference, a foreign currency, a different inflation rate, an external financing condition, border formalities, political risk and a policy decision taken by another sovereign government. The subject therefore joins microeconomic trade theory with open-economy macroeconomics and political economy.

The global setting makes these tools practical rather than historical. The World Trade Organization reported that world merchandise trade volume grew 4.6% in 2025 and commercial-services trade volume 5.3%. In its March 2026 baseline, before allowing for the full uncertainty generated by the then-current Middle East conflict, merchandise trade growth was projected to slow to 1.9% in 2026 while services growth was projected at 4.8%. The current-dollar value of world merchandise exports reached US\$26.26 trillion in 2025 and services trade US\$9.56 trillion (World Trade Organization [WTO], 2026). The report also emphasized unusually high trade-policy uncertainty, energy and shipping risks, and the exceptional contribution of AI-related goods to recent trade growth. These facts do not prove either globalization or deglobalization as a universal trend. They show a world in which trade remains economically large while its geography, composition and policy conditions are being reconfigured.

For African economies, international economics is inseparable from structural transformation. The continent contains countries that are landlocked and coastal, commodity-rich and commodity-poor, large and small, more or less diversified, and governed by different currency and regional arrangements. A tariff that appears protective in a partial-equilibrium model can increase the cost of imported machinery and intermediate inputs used by domestic producers. A currency depreciation can improve price competitiveness while simultaneously raising fuel, fertilizer, medicine and foreign-currency debt costs. A regional preference can create new demand for local production, but it can also divert sourcing from a lower-cost external supplier. The relevant policy

question is therefore rarely whether openness is simply good or bad. It is which mechanism is operating, who bears the transition, what capabilities exist to respond and which policy instruments remain available.

MANAGERIAL INSIGHT | International economics is part of the operating environment

An exporter, importer, bank, manufacturer or investor does not choose the national tariff schedule, inflation regime or regional agreement, yet those institutions alter costs, demand, cash flows, competitive conditions and strategic options. The professional task is to translate country-level economic mechanisms into decision-relevant exposures without confusing macroeconomic analysis with the firm-level hedging and internationalization choices developed in Chapters 15 and 17.

14.1.1 Positive, normative and political-economy questions

Three kinds of questions recur throughout the chapter. Positive economics asks what a change is likely to do: how a tariff changes domestic price and imports, how depreciation affects inflation, or how a customs union changes sourcing. Normative economics asks how outcomes should be evaluated: whether an aggregate efficiency gain justifies concentrated losses, which distributional weights matter, or what degree of sovereignty should be pooled. Political economy asks how actual policy is chosen when voters, firms, workers, bureaucracies, regional institutions and governments have different interests and unequal influence. A technically coherent welfare calculation does not explain why a policy was adopted, and a political explanation does not establish that the policy is economically or morally desirable.

Chapter 13 provides the book-wide moral and governance vocabulary for these distinctions. Chapter 14 applies it to cross-border economic choices. The analysis therefore resists two symmetrical errors. One is to treat freer trade and deeper integration as self-authenticating progress. The other is to treat borders, protection or national discretion as self-authenticating goods. Economic institutions deserve evaluation by their mechanisms, evidence, distributional consequences, accountability, subsidiarity and contribution to human flourishing.

14.2 Historical and Intellectual Foundations of International Trade

International trade theory developed partly as a critique of the idea that national wealth is created by accumulating money or by maximizing exports while suppressing imports. Early modern mercantilist practices varied across countries and periods, but the broad doctrine associated national power with favorable trade balances, colonial privilege and state support for strategic commerce. Adam Smith (1776/1976) attacked the zero-sum intuition behind much mercantilist reasoning. Specialization and exchange, he argued, can enlarge the productive possibilities available to trading partners when each directs resources toward activities in which it is relatively productive. Smith's treatment of absolute cost advantages was a major step, but it did not resolve the harder case in which one country is more productive in every activity.

David Ricardo's (1817/1951) theory of comparative advantage supplied that result. Trade can be beneficial even when one country has an absolute productivity advantage in all goods, because the economically relevant comparison is opportunity cost: what must be forgone to produce one more unit of a good. A country should not be understood as "competitive" merely because its workers are absolutely more productive. It may still gain by specializing relatively more in the activities where its productivity advantage is greatest and importing activities where its relative disadvantage is smallest. The principle is logically powerful because it separates absolute efficiency from comparative cost.

Twentieth-century theory progressively relaxed Ricardo's assumptions. Heckscher-Ohlin reasoning linked trade patterns to relative factor abundance; the specific-factors model explained why short-run distributional effects differ when some resources cannot move easily across sectors; Stolper and Samuelson (1941) formalized how goods prices can alter real factor rewards under stronger assumptions; Krugman (1979) showed how increasing returns and monopolistic competition can generate trade among similar countries; Melitz (2003) introduced firm heterogeneity and the selection effects created by export fixed costs; and the modern gravity literature made bilateral trade costs and multilateral resistance central to empirical analysis (Anderson & van Wincoop, 2003). Each extension captures a mechanism that the simpler model omits. None should be treated as a universal law that mechanically predicts every country-product pair.

Table 14.3. Major international-trade perspectives: mechanisms, insights and limits.

Perspective	Core mechanism	What it explains well	Principal limits / cautions
Ricardian comparative advantage	Relative labor productivity and opportunity cost	Why mutually beneficial specialization can arise even when one country is absolutely more productive in all goods.	One-factor benchmark; abstracts from distribution, scale economies, firm heterogeneity, institutions and many adjustment frictions.
Heckscher-Ohlin	Relative factor abundance and factor intensity	Why countries may export goods that intensively use relatively abundant factors.	Empirical factor content is affected by technology, human capital, trade costs, intermediate inputs and measurement; factors are not equally mobile or homogeneous.
Specific factors	Short-run immobility of sector-specific resources	Why trade shocks create concentrated sectoral winners and losers during adjustment.	Short-run structure; does not by itself describe long-run reallocation or modern multi-input production networks.
Stolper-Samuelson	Goods-price changes transmit to real factor rewards	A rigorous link between trade prices and distribution under the Heckscher-Ohlin framework.	Requires restrictive assumptions; should not be converted into a mechanical prediction for wages in every economy.
New trade theory	Increasing returns, product differentiation and monopolistic competition	Intra-industry trade, product variety, scale and trade among similar economies.	Market structure and firm behavior matter; potential scale benefits can coexist with market power and spatial concentration.
Heterogeneous-firm trade	Only sufficiently productive firms cover fixed export costs; trade reallocates	Exporter selection, within-industry productivity effects and why firms respond	Firm selection can impose exit and labor adjustment costs; productivity effects depend

Perspective	Core mechanism	What it explains well	Principal limits / cautions
	market share	differently to the same policy.	on market structure, finance and institutions.
Structural gravity	Bilateral trade depends on economic size and relative bilateral trade costs within the whole trading system	Empirical trade-flow prediction and evaluation of distance, borders and integration arrangements.	Causal policy evaluation requires careful identification; naive gravity regressions can omit multilateral resistance or selection.

Source/Note: Author's synthesis drawing on Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Heckscher (1919/1991), Krugman (1979), Melitz (2003), Ricardo (1817/1951), Stolper and Samuelson (1941), and related trade theory.

14.3 Absolute Advantage, Comparative Advantage and Opportunity Cost

14.3.1 Absolute advantage is about productivity, not the gains-from-trade criterion

Suppose two economies can use the same amount of labor to produce two outputs. Economy K can produce either 60 units of coffee or 20 units of software services; Economy B can produce either 30 units of coffee or 40 units of software services. Economy K has an absolute advantage in coffee because the same resource produces more coffee there. Economy B has an absolute advantage in software. In this simple case, the direction of specialization seems obvious. Comparative advantage becomes more important when one economy is absolutely better at both outputs, because opportunity costs can still differ.




Figure 14.2. Illustrative production possibility frontiers and opportunity cost.

Source/Note: Author's illustrative model. Quantities are fictional and are used only to teach opportunity-cost logic; they are not estimates for any actual country.

For Economy K, producing 20 software units costs 60 coffee units. One software unit therefore costs 3 coffee units. Conversely, one coffee unit costs one-third of a software unit. For Economy B, producing 40 software units costs 30 coffee units, so one software unit costs 0.75 coffee units and one coffee unit costs 4/3 of a software unit. Economy K has comparative advantage in coffee because it sacrifices fewer software units per coffee unit. Economy B has comparative advantage in software because it sacrifices fewer coffee units per software unit.

$$\text{Opportunity cost of } X \text{ in terms of } Y = \text{maximum } Y / \text{maximum } X$$

In a linear two-good production possibility frontier, the opportunity cost equals the absolute slope. More general production technologies generate changing marginal opportunity costs.

14.3.2 Worked example: the mutually beneficial terms-of-trade interval

The gains from specialization require an international exchange ratio that lies between domestic opportunity costs. Economy K will export coffee for software only if it receives more than one-third software unit per coffee unit, because one coffee costs it one-third software at home. Economy B will import coffee only if it gives up less than 4/3 software units per coffee, because it could produce coffee domestically at that opportunity cost. Any terms of trade between one-third and 4/3 software units per coffee can therefore make both better off relative to autarky, subject to transport costs, adjustment and the assumptions of the model.

Table 14.4. Worked comparative-advantage example.

Item	Economy K	Economy B	Interpretation
Maximum coffee with full resources	60	30	K has absolute advantage in coffee.
Maximum software with full resources	20	40	B has absolute advantage in software.
Opportunity cost of 1 coffee	1/3 software	4/3 software	K has comparative advantage in coffee.
Opportunity cost of 1 software	3 coffee	0.75 coffee	B has comparative advantage in software.

Item	Economy K	Economy B	Interpretation
Mutually beneficial price of 1 coffee	Greater than 1/3 software	Less than 4/3 software	A trade price inside this interval can benefit both in the benchmark model.

Source/Note: Author's illustrative calculation. The model assumes constant unit labor requirements, full employment, no transport cost, no policy barriers and frictionless reallocation; these assumptions are relaxed progressively in the chapter.

WORKED EXAMPLE | What comparative advantage does - and does not - prove

The theorem shows that differences in opportunity cost can create a feasible efficiency gain from exchange. It does not prove that every observed trade pattern reflects free choice, that adjustment is costless, that income gains are equally distributed, that governments should never intervene, or that a country should permanently specialize in its current low-productivity activities. Those are separate empirical and normative questions.

14.4 The Ricardian Model in Analytical Form

A standard Ricardian model uses one factor of production, labor, and constant unit labor requirements. Let a_{LX} denote labor hours required to produce one unit of good X and a_{LY} the hours required for one unit of good Y. With L total labor, the production constraint is $a_{LX}X + a_{LY}Y \leq L$. The opportunity cost of X in terms of Y is a_{LX} / a_{LY} . The country with the lower ratio has comparative advantage in X. Under perfect competition, unit cost is wage times unit labor requirement, so relative goods prices are linked to relative productivity.

$$a_{LX}X + a_{LY}Y \leq L \quad \text{and} \quad OC_X = a_{LX} / a_{LY}$$

L is the labor endowment. a_{LX} and a_{LY} are unit labor requirements. The lower opportunity cost, not the lower absolute labor requirement alone, determines comparative advantage.

The Ricardian framework remains indispensable because it clarifies the source of gains without requiring identical technologies or equal wages. Its simplicity also makes its limitations visible. Labor is not homogeneous; production uses capital, land, skills, energy, imported intermediates and organizational capability; technologies can change through investment and learning; workers do not move instantly across occupations or regions; and countries can have unemployment or informal labor markets. Transport costs, standards, exchange rates, finance and policy can overwhelm a modest comparative cost difference. In contemporary production networks, a country may import inputs, add a stage of value and re-export, so gross trade values can also misrepresent domestic value added.

A further limitation is dynamic. Comparative advantage describes relative opportunity costs under a given technology and endowment structure. Development policy is often concerned with how those costs can change. Education, infrastructure, energy reliability, managerial capability, technological adoption and agglomeration can alter future productivity. It is therefore legitimate to distinguish static comparative advantage from dynamic comparative advantage. The existence of that distinction does not, however, validate every industrial-policy claim. A government that wishes to shift comparative advantage must identify a credible learning or coordination mechanism and compare it with the risks of protection, fiscal cost and political capture.

CRITICAL DEBATE | Is comparative advantage a development strategy?

Comparative advantage is a theorem about the gains from exchange under specified conditions, not a complete theory of development. Treating current specialization as destiny can freeze the very capabilities that development seeks to change. Treating comparative advantage as irrelevant can waste scarce resources on activities with no plausible path to productivity. Good policy uses current cost information while asking which market failures and learning processes could responsibly alter future capabilities.

14.5 Factor Endowments, Specific Factors and the Distribution of Trade

14.5.1 Heckscher-Ohlin: trade as an exchange of factor services

The Heckscher-Ohlin tradition asks why relative opportunity costs differ when countries have access to broadly similar technologies. The answer is factor abundance. A country relatively abundant in capital, skilled labor, land or another productive factor tends, under the model's assumptions, to have a lower autarky cost for goods that use that factor intensively. Trade then acts indirectly as an exchange of factor services embodied in goods. A land-abundant economy may export land-intensive agricultural output; a skill-abundant economy may export skill-intensive services or manufactures. The framework shifts attention from technology alone to the structure of productive endowments (Heckscher, 1919/1991; Ohlin, 1933).

The model is analytically useful but easy to overstate. "Capital abundance" is not simply a count of machines, and "labor abundance" says little about skills, institutions or productivity. Modern goods contain imported intermediate inputs and intangible capital, while services trade can embody human capital without crossing a physical border in the traditional sense. Technologies differ across countries, factors vary in quality, and transport and policy costs can reverse predicted trade. Empirical work inspired by the Leontief paradox demonstrated early that factor-content predictions require careful measurement and cannot be read directly from headline endowment ratios. The appropriate lesson is not that endowments are irrelevant, but that endowments interact with technology, institutions, infrastructure and firms.

14.5.2 Stolper-Samuelson and the long-run distributional logic

Within the two-good, two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin structure, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem links goods prices to real factor rewards. If the relative price of the good intensive in a particular factor rises, the real return to that factor can rise while the real return to the other factor falls, under the theorem's assumptions (Stolper & Samuelson, 1941). The result matters because it destroys the notion that national gains from trade are automatically gains for every person. Trade changes relative prices, and relative prices redistribute income through wages, rents and returns to capital.

The theorem is not a direct forecasting model for a modern labor market. Workers differ by occupation, skill, gender, location and bargaining position; production uses many factors; firms have market power; social protection varies; and imported intermediates can increase domestic productivity rather than merely compete with final output. Nevertheless, the theorem provides a disciplined warning: when policy lowers the price of an import-competing good, the owners of factors tied to that activity may lose even if consumers and export sectors gain. Distribution is a mechanism, not an afterthought.

14.5.3 Specific factors and short-run adjustment

The specific-factors model, associated with Jones (1971) and related work, is especially useful for the time dimension of adjustment. Some productive resources are mobile across activities in the short run, while others are specific to a sector. A general worker may move from apparel to food processing with retraining, but a specialized machine, mine, location-specific supplier network or accumulated occupational skill may not. A rise in the relative price of an export good therefore tends to raise the real return to the factor specific to that export sector and reduce the return to the factor specific to the import-competing sector. The effect on the mobile factor can be ambiguous because the prices of consumption goods also change.

Table 14.5. Distributional mechanisms in factor-based trade theory.

Framework	Time horizon / mobility	Likely distributional insight	Professional use
Heckscher-Ohlin	Longer-run benchmark with factor mobility across domestic sectors	Trade patterns reflect relative factor abundance and factor intensity.	Diagnose whether a trade pattern plausibly reflects endowment structure, while checking technology and institutional differences.
Stolper-Samuelson	Long-run comparative statics under restrictive two-factor assumptions	A rise in the price of a factor-intensive good can raise that factor's real return and lower the other factor's real return.	Reminds analysts that trade-induced goods-price changes redistribute income even when aggregate welfare rises.
Specific factors	Short run with some resources immobile across sectors	Sector-specific owners in expanding activities gain; owners in contracting activities can lose sharply.	Useful for analyzing transition costs, regional concentration, retraining needs and the politics of protection.
Modern labor-market evidence	Actual workers face search, skill, place and institutional frictions	Losses can be persistent and spatially concentrated; adjustment is not automatic.	Requires labor-market, social-protection, mobility and place-based evidence in addition to trade models.

Source/Note: Author's synthesis drawing on Jones (1971), Stolper and Samuelson (1941), Autor et al. (2013), and Topalova (2010).

14.6 New Trade Theory: Scale, Variety and Intra-Industry Trade

Classical comparative advantage emphasizes differences between countries. Yet much observed trade occurs among economies with similar factor endowments and within the same broad industries. Germany exports cars and imports cars; countries export and import differentiated chemicals, machinery, food products and business services. New trade theory explains this pattern through increasing returns, product differentiation and imperfect competition. When a firm incurs a fixed cost to create a product or plant, average cost can fall as output expands. Access to a larger market therefore permits greater scale, while consumers may value greater variety (Krugman, 1979).

The welfare logic differs from the Ricardian model. Even if two countries have identical technology and factor endowments, integrating their markets can increase product variety and allow firms to operate at more efficient scale. Competition can also force high-cost producers to contract. The same mechanism creates policy ambiguity. Scale economies can support geographic concentration, first-mover advantages and market power. A larger integrated market can lower prices and expand variety, but it can also shift production toward already-established clusters. For smaller or less-developed economies, market access without complementary capability may enlarge demand while leaving production concentrated elsewhere.

$$GL_i = 1 - |X_i - M_i| / (X_i + M_i)$$

The Grubel-Lloyd index is a common descriptive measure of intra-industry trade in product i . It approaches 1 when exports and imports are similar in value and 0 when trade is one-way. It describes trade structure; it does not identify causal welfare effects.

Suppose a sector exports US\$80 million and imports US\$60 million. The Grubel-Lloyd index is $1 - |80 - 60| / (80 + 60) = 1 - 20/140 = 0.857$. The high value indicates substantial two-way trade in the sector. It does not mean that the same firms both export and import, that products are identical, or that domestic value added is high. The index should therefore be paired with product detail, firm data and value-added information before making claims about industrial sophistication.

14.7 Heterogeneous Firms: Why the Same Border Shock Produces Different Firm Outcomes

Melitz (2003) changed the unit of analysis inside an industry. Firms differ in productivity, and exporting carries fixed costs such as market research, certification, distribution setup, documentation, adaptation and relationship building. Only firms productive enough to cover those fixed costs export. When trade costs fall, more productive firms expand into foreign markets, some marginal firms begin exporting, market share is reallocated toward higher-productivity firms, and the least productive firms may exit. Aggregate industry productivity can therefore rise even without every continuing firm becoming more productive.

This mechanism has direct implications for African integration. A tariff preference or lower border cost does not affect every enterprise equally. Large formal firms with finance, quality systems and logistics capability may use the opportunity quickly; smaller firms may face fixed compliance, information or financing constraints that prevent participation. If analysts report only export growth, they can miss who is entering, who is excluded, whether supplier networks deepen, and whether gains concentrate in a few incumbents. Regional integration policy that seeks broad-based firm participation must therefore address fixed trade costs and capability, not only marginal tariffs.

AFRICAN CONTEXT | The extensive margin matters

A continental market becomes economically deeper not only when existing exporters ship more, but when additional firms and products become capable of crossing borders. That “extensive margin” requires reliable information, standards capability, finance, logistics, digital access and predictable procedures. Lowering one formal tariff may have little effect if fixed costs remain prohibitive.

14.8 The Gravity Model: Economic Size, Distance and Relative Trade Costs

The gravity model is the empirical workhorse of international trade. In its simplest analogy, bilateral trade is larger between large economies and smaller when trade costs are high. Modern structural gravity goes further by recognizing that bilateral trade depends on the cost of trading between i and j relative to the cost of trading with all alternative partners. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) call these system-wide price effects multilateral resistance. A landlocked country can trade intensively with a neighbor even if the bilateral route is expensive when every alternative route is even more expensive.

$$X_{ij} = (Y_i Y_j / Y_W) * (t_{ij} / (P_i P_j))^{(1 - \sigma)}$$

A stylized structural-gravity expression. X_{ij} is bilateral trade, Y_i and Y_j are economic sizes, Y_W world income, t_{ij} bilateral trade costs, P_i and P_j multilateral resistance terms, and σ the elasticity of substitution. Empirical implementations require more careful specification and estimation.

Distance in gravity models is not only kilometers. It proxies transport cost, time, information frictions and historical networks; researchers also use borders, language, colonial links, regional agreements and infrastructure measures. Because policy agreements are not randomly assigned, causal evaluation requires methods that control for unobserved country-pair characteristics and time-varying exporter and importer conditions. Stack et al. (2024), for example, use a structural gravity model with rich fixed effects to evaluate African economic integration in manufacturing. They find that economic integration agreements in aggregate enhance African exports, but the effects differ by agreement type and market; their AfCFTA counterfactual suggests stronger intra-African effects than a narrower tripartite configuration. Such estimates are informative precisely because they are model-based and conditional, not because the gravity equation mechanically proves that every agreement works.

Krantz (2025) provides a complementary EAC perspective using detailed trade and multi-region input-output data. The study finds the EAC moderately integrated into global and regional value chains, with regional integration advancing more clearly in agriculture and food processing and Kenya becoming a more important regional manufacturing supplier. Its reduced-form evidence indicates positive development effects from trade and value-chain integration, especially deeper forward manufacturing linkages. The result is encouraging but context-specific: integration can generate gains through particular sectoral linkages without implying that all sectors or member states benefit equally.

EVIDENCE CHECK | Gravity is powerful because it is comparative

A bilateral trade flow is never interpreted in isolation. Structural gravity asks how large the flow is relative to economic size and the whole network of alternative trade costs. For policy evaluation, use specifications that address multilateral resistance and the endogeneity of agreements; otherwise a “regional integration effect” may simply capture geography, history or pre-existing trade intensity.

14.9 Gains from Trade, Terms of Trade and the Distribution of Adjustment**14.9.1 Static gains: consumption possibilities beyond domestic production**

In the benchmark comparative-advantage model, specialization and exchange allow a country to consume a bundle that lies beyond its own production possibility frontier. The gain arises because imported goods can be obtained at an international relative price lower than the domestic opportunity cost that would have prevailed without trade. This is an efficiency claim. It does not require trade to increase every nominal wage, every sector's output or every firm's revenue. It requires the value of the expanded consumption possibilities, under the model's assumptions, to exceed the value available under autarky.

The terms of trade summarize one important price relationship: the price of a country's exports relative to the price of its imports. An improvement means that a given quantity of exports can purchase more imports, other things equal. For commodity exporters, a large world price rise can improve the terms of trade and fiscal revenues; for commodity importers, the same shock can worsen external balances and household purchasing power. Terms-of-trade gains are therefore not equivalent to productivity gains. A country can become temporarily richer because its commodity price rises without becoming more productive, diversified or institutionally capable.

$$\text{Terms of trade index} = (\text{export price index} / \text{import price index}) \times 100$$

An increase indicates that export prices rose relative to import prices. Interpretation requires attention to volumes, contract structures, commodity concentration and exchange-rate conventions.

14.9.2 Dynamic gains and the evidence problem

Trade can also affect long-run growth through mechanisms that lie outside the static model. Larger markets can increase scale, competition can pressure firms to improve, imported capital goods can embody technology, exporting can expose firms to demanding buyers, and access to diverse intermediates can raise productivity. Foreign demand can support learning by doing, while value-chain participation can spread standards and managerial practices. These mechanisms are plausible and supported in many settings, but they do not imply that openness mechanically causes convergence. Outcomes depend on education, finance, infrastructure, institutions, firm capability, competition and the nature of specialization.

The causal literature is accordingly nuanced. Some studies use geography, policy shocks or quasi-experimental designs to isolate trade exposure; others show that the same liberalization can generate different local outcomes because industries and workers are distributed unevenly. A professional reader should therefore separate three claims: trade changes relative prices and market access;

those changes alter resource allocation; and the resulting allocation may or may not generate sustained productivity growth. The first mechanism is strongest theoretically, while the second and third depend increasingly on adjustment and institutions.

14.9.3 Aggregate gains do not compensate people automatically

A recurring analytical mistake is to infer that because a country gains in aggregate, no important group loses. Autor et al. (2013) examined U.S. local labor markets exposed to rapidly rising Chinese import competition and found significant, persistent effects on manufacturing employment, wages and transfer payments. Topalova (2010), studying India's trade liberalization, found slower poverty reduction and consumption growth in rural districts more exposed to tariff cuts, particularly where labor mobility was limited. These studies examine different contexts and identification strategies, but both demonstrate that adjustment is geographically and institutionally mediated rather than instantaneous.

Distributional analysis should therefore ask at least five questions. Who receives lower consumer prices? Which producers gain export demand or cheaper inputs? Which workers and owners bear import competition? How rapidly can labor and capital move into alternative activities? Which public or private institutions share transition costs? The last question is often neglected. Economic theory may show that winners could in principle compensate losers, but actual compensation requires political decisions, administrative capacity and legitimate financing. If compensation never occurs, a hypothetical Pareto improvement is not the lived distributional outcome.

POLICY LENS | Adjustment policy is part of trade policy

Trade policy is frequently debated at the border while adjustment occurs in labor markets, places, credit systems and households. Skills programs, mobility support, social insurance, infrastructure, competition policy and place-sensitive investment can determine whether an aggregate trade gain becomes broadly accessible. Their effectiveness must be evaluated rather than assumed.

14.10 Tariffs, Quotas, Subsidies and Non-Tariff Measures

14.10.1 The small-country tariff benchmark

A tariff is a tax on imports. In the small-country benchmark, the country is too small to influence the world price, so the domestic price of the imported good rises by the tariff, assuming full pass-through. Domestic consumers reduce demand, domestic producers expand supply, and imports fall. Consumer surplus declines; producer surplus rises; government collects tariff revenue; and two deadweight losses remain, one from inefficiently expanding higher-cost domestic production and one from consumption that no longer occurs even though its value exceeded the world resource cost. The model is intentionally partial equilibrium: it abstracts from exchange-rate changes, tariff evasion, retaliation, input-output linkages and distribution across households.




Figure 14.3. Small-country tariff logic: redistribution plus efficiency loss.

Source/Note: Author's illustrative partial-equilibrium diagram. The world price is taken as exogenous and the tariff is assumed to pass through fully to the domestic price. Actual outcomes can differ with market power, exchange rates, imperfect competition, evasion and imported intermediate inputs.

$$\text{Tariff revenue} = \text{tariff per unit} \times \text{quantity imported after the tariff}$$

Tariff revenue is a fiscal transfer, not itself a net national resource gain. Net welfare in the benchmark subtracts production and consumption distortions from the pre-tariff free-trade outcome.

14.10.2 Worked tariff example

Suppose a country imports a product at a world price of US\$100. Domestic demand at that price is 1,000 units and domestic supply 300 units, so imports equal 700. A US\$20 specific tariff raises the domestic price to US\$120 in the small-country benchmark. At that price, demand falls to 900 and domestic supply rises to 400, leaving 500 imports. Government tariff revenue is therefore

US\$10,000. The fiscal revenue is visible, but it is not a free benefit: consumers pay more, some consumption disappears and higher-cost domestic production replaces lower-cost imports. To calculate full surplus changes, the analyst needs the shapes of supply and demand, not only the revenue number.

Table 14.6. Worked tariff example: quantity and fiscal effects.

Variable	Before tariff	After US\$20 tariff	Change / interpretation
World / landed benchmark price	US\$100	US\$100	Small-country assumption: foreign price unchanged.
Domestic price	US\$100	US\$120	Full tariff pass-through assumed.
Domestic demand	1,000 units	900 units	Consumption contracts as price rises.
Domestic supply	300 units	400 units	Protected domestic output expands.
Imports	700 units	500 units	Import volume falls by 200 units.
Tariff revenue	US\$0	US\$10,000	US\$20 x 500 imported units; a transfer to government, not the total welfare effect.

Source/Note: Author's illustrative calculation. The example assumes a small country, full pass-through, no retaliation, no evasion and no general-equilibrium effects.

14.10.3 Quotas and quota rents

An import quota restricts quantity directly. If it produces the same import volume as a tariff, the domestic price effect can be similar, but the distribution of rents differs. A tariff generates public revenue. A quota creates scarcity rents equal to the price wedge times the permitted import quantity. Those rents may accrue to domestic license holders, foreign exporters or government if rights are auctioned. Administrative allocation can also create lobbying and corruption incentives. Under uncertainty, quotas and tariffs respond differently: a fixed quota prevents import quantity from rising when demand surges, so the domestic price can increase sharply.

14.10.4 Production subsidies and targeted support

A production subsidy can expand domestic output without directly raising the consumer price of imports, which makes it less distortionary than a tariff when the narrow objective is to support production. The cost is borne through the fiscal system, and the policy still needs a defensible rationale. If the problem is a learning externality, a time-bound production or capability subsidy tied to measurable learning may target the mechanism more directly than broad protection. If the problem is national security or essential supply, procurement, stockpiles, diversification or contingent capacity may be more proportionate. Policy design should begin with the market failure or public objective rather than with the politically convenient instrument.

14.10.5 Local-content measures: domestic linkages versus hidden input costs

Local-content measures require or encourage producers, investors or public purchasers to source a specified share of inputs, labor or value added domestically. Their economic rationale can be stronger than simple import substitution when the policy addresses supplier-development externalities, missing coordination or the inability of new local firms to reach scale without an anchor buyer. A carefully designed requirement can create demand visibility for local suppliers, stimulate quality upgrading and help knowledge diffuse through production networks. These effects are not guaranteed, however, and the relevant comparison is with alternative instruments such as supplier-development grants, infrastructure, training, competitive procurement or temporary co-investment.

The principal risk is that a numerical domestic-content target becomes an accounting objective rather than a productivity mechanism. If local inputs are substantially more expensive, unreliable or below required quality, mandatory sourcing can raise final costs, reduce export competitiveness and penalize downstream firms. Rules can also favor politically connected incumbents or induce firms to reorganize invoices without creating genuine domestic capability. A defensible policy therefore measures learning, supplier entry, quality, productivity and eventual cost convergence, not merely the domestic percentage. Legal compatibility with trade and investment obligations is a separate question for Chapter 19; Chapter 14 evaluates the economic mechanism and incidence.

14.10.6 Non-tariff measures: legitimate regulation versus unnecessary trade cost

Non-tariff measures include sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, technical regulations, licensing, testing, labeling, quantity controls and other measures that affect trade without taking the form of an ordinary customs tariff. Their economic analysis requires more care than the slogan “non-tariff barrier” suggests. Food-safety testing, pharmaceutical quality rules and electrical standards can protect life and support trust. The same objective can nevertheless be pursued through procedures that are redundant, discriminatory, unpredictable or poorly coordinated, creating unnecessary trade cost.

UNCTAD's African evidence is especially important here because it estimates that non-tariff measures restrict intra-African trade substantially more than tariffs (UNCTAD, 2025). The correct policy implication is not deregulation by default. It is regulatory quality: make legitimate objectives explicit, use evidence-based and proportionate requirements, recognize equivalent outcomes where appropriate, digitalize and coordinate procedures, and measure delays and compliance cost. Harmonization can reduce duplication, but it can also centralize rule-making or impose standards that are costly for smaller producers. Mutual recognition, equivalence and regional coordination are alternative designs that should be compared rather than assumed inferior.

14.10.7 Effective protection when imported inputs matter

Nominal tariffs can be misleading for producers that import intermediate inputs. The effective rate of protection (ERP) measures how the tariff structure changes domestic value added rather than the final-good price alone. A high tariff on the final product combined with low tariffs on inputs can create effective protection greater than the nominal final tariff. Conversely, taxing essential imported inputs can sharply reduce or even reverse effective protection for domestic processing.

$$ERP = (V_t - V_w) / V_w$$

V_t is value added per unit under the tariff structure and V_w is value added at world prices. A positive ERP raises domestic value added relative to the world-price benchmark; a negative ERP penalizes the activity.

If a final product sells for US\$100 at world prices and imported inputs cost US\$60, world-price value added is US\$40. Suppose a 20% tariff raises the protected final price to US\$120 while a 10% tariff raises input cost to US\$66. Domestic value added becomes US\$54. The effective rate of protection is $(54 - 40)/40 = 35\%$, greater than the 20% nominal final tariff. If input tariffs were much higher, the result could be lower. For African industrialization, this calculation is critical because firms often depend on imported machinery, components, chemicals or packaging. Protection of a final good can unintentionally tax the very inputs required for local upgrading.

14.10.8 Large-country tariffs, terms-of-trade effects and retaliation

The small-country benchmark assumes the importing economy cannot influence the foreign supply price. A sufficiently large importer may instead possess market power. If its tariff reduces world demand for the imported product, foreign exporters may lower their pre-tariff price, shifting part of the burden abroad and improving the importing country's terms of trade. In a stylized setting, an optimal tariff can be related inversely to the foreign export-supply elasticity: the less responsive foreign supply is to price, the greater the potential terms-of-trade gain. This result is analytically important because it shows that the national-welfare effect of a tariff need not be identical for small and large countries (Johnson, 1953).

$$t^* \text{ approximately equals } 1 / \epsilon^*$$

A stylized optimal-tariff expression for a large country. ϵ^* is the foreign export-supply elasticity facing the importer. The formula abstracts from retaliation, market structure, input linkages, distribution, uncertainty and legal constraints.

The result is not a general recommendation for protection. Other governments can retaliate, suppliers can redirect trade, downstream firms can lose competitiveness, uncertainty can delay investment and a national terms-of-trade gain can be smaller than the resulting global efficiency loss. In repeated strategic interaction, attempts by multiple large economies to exploit market power can leave all worse off. Policy analysis must therefore distinguish the existence of market power from the prudence or legitimacy of using it, and must evaluate retaliation, negotiation, alliances, supply-chain substitution and institutional rules. Formal trade remedies and treaty constraints are examined in Chapter 19.

CRITICAL DEBATE | An optimal tariff is not an ethically or strategically optimal policy

A textbook large-country model can generate a positive unilateral tariff under narrow assumptions. Real policy must add retaliation, downstream input costs, uncertainty, geopolitical spillovers, distribution and rules-based commitments. The existence of a theoretical rent-shifting opportunity does not establish that exercising it serves the common good.

14.11 Protectionism and the Political Economy of Trade Policy

Trade policy is not chosen by a benevolent calculator. Benefits and costs differ in concentration, visibility and organization. Consumers may each lose a small amount from a tariff while a protected industry gains a large amount per firm, giving producers stronger incentives to lobby. Grossman and Helpman's (1994) "protection for sale" framework formalizes how organized interests and political contributions can influence policy within a political-equilibrium model. The point is not that every tariff is corrupt. It is that policy evaluation must consider who has the incentive and capacity to shape the rules.

Legitimate public objectives complicate the picture. Governments may seek revenue, food security, strategic capacity, regional development, environmental protection, bargaining leverage or protection from coercive dependencies. Some objectives can justify intervention even when static consumer prices rise. But invoking a broad term such as "security" does not establish proportionality. The analyst should ask whether the risk is concrete, whether the instrument targets it, what alternative instruments cost, how long support will last, who audits performance and how exit occurs if the rationale disappears.

CRITICAL DEBATE | Protection can correct a problem - or institutionalize one

Temporary protection may allow learning where firms face a genuine, time-limited capability gap and where learning spills over beyond the firm. The same tariff can become permanent rent protection if performance cannot be measured, political influence blocks exit or consumers finance inefficiency indefinitely. The economic case therefore depends on mechanism and governance, not on the word "infant."

14.12 Industrial Policy, Structural Transformation and the Possibility of Learning

14.12.1 The infant-industry argument

The infant-industry argument begins with a dynamic externality. A new domestic activity may initially have costs above world price but can become competitive through learning, supplier development, scale or coordination. If individual firms cannot capture the full social return to that learning, private investment can be below the socially desirable level. Temporary support may then improve welfare. This is a stronger argument than simply preferring domestic production, because it identifies a mechanism that could make the future different from the present.

The informational problem is formidable. Governments must distinguish a true learning opportunity from a permanently high-cost activity, identify the relevant externality, choose an instrument, resist capture and withdraw support. Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) emphasize "self-discovery": entrepreneurs learn which activities a country can produce profitably, but successful experimentation can be imitated, weakening private incentives to discover. Their argument helps explain why information externalities may justify policy. It does not imply that central planners know the future sectoral structure ex ante.

14.12.2 Strategic trade policy under oligopoly: rent shifting and informational limits

Strategic trade policy differs from the infant-industry argument. In markets with a small number of large firms, scale economies and strategic interaction can generate economic rents. Brander and Spencer (1985) showed that, under particular assumptions, an export subsidy can alter firms' output choices and shift part of an oligopolistic rent from a foreign rival to a domestic firm. The mechanism is not general protection of an immature sector; it is strategic intervention in an imperfectly competitive game. The model was influential because it demonstrated that departures from perfect competition can overturn some laissez-faire conclusions even when no learning externality is present.

Its practical use is constrained by information and retaliation. Governments rarely observe firms' cost functions, strategic responses and demand conditions with the precision assumed by the model. A subsidy that looks rent-shifting can become a transfer to shareholders, encourage excessive capacity, provoke counter-subsidies or lock public resources into a politically powerful incumbent. Strategic-trade arguments therefore require unusually strong evidence on market structure, contestability, spillovers, fiscal exposure and likely foreign response. The policy should be compared with competition policy, R&D support, shared infrastructure and other instruments that may strengthen capability without underwriting a specific firm's commercial gamble.

14.12.3 Modern industrial policy: from sector picking to capability ecosystems

Industrial policy has returned to mainstream debate as governments respond to supply-chain shocks, technological competition, energy transitions and weak productivity growth. Juhasz et al. (2024) review a large modern literature and emphasize that industrial policy is diverse: it can include targeted finance, infrastructure, procurement, R&D support, training, export discipline, clusters and coordination rather than tariffs alone. The central empirical question is not whether governments ever influence industrial structure - they plainly do - but which interventions generate additional social value after administrative cost, misallocation and political economy are considered.

The World Bank's April 2026 Africa Economic Update frames the challenge in explicitly institutional terms. It argues that Sub-Saharan Africa's growth problem is structural, with low investment, weak productivity and limited job creation, and recommends a pragmatic, ecosystem-based industrial policy aligned with state capability rather than a uniform recipe (World Bank, 2026). This orientation is important because an industrial target cannot compensate for unreliable power, congested logistics, weak competition, scarce technical skills or macroeconomic instability. Sector support that ignores ecosystem constraints can simply capitalize bottlenecks into higher rents.

A defensible industrial-policy proposal should therefore pass a sequence of tests. First, identify the market failure, coordination problem or strategic public objective. Second, show why a horizontal reform alone is insufficient. Third, choose the narrowest instrument likely to address the mechanism. Fourth, create measurable milestones related to productivity, capability, exports, learning or resilience rather than political visibility. Fifth, preserve competition and entry where possible. Sixth, disclose fiscal and consumer costs. Seventh, build sunset, review and failure procedures. Finally, evaluate distribution and moral legitimacy, especially when the policy shifts costs onto lower-income consumers or less-connected firms.

Table 14.7. Industrial-policy diagnostic: from rationale to disciplined implementation.

Question	Evidence required	Failure mode if ignored
What problem is being solved?	Externality, coordination failure, learning gap, security risk or other clearly defined objective.	Support becomes a slogan for favored sectors or incumbents.
Why this instrument?	Comparison of tariff, subsidy, infrastructure, procurement, training, finance, R&D or regulatory alternatives.	A politically convenient instrument distorts more margins than necessary.
What is the additionality?	Counterfactual: what firms would do without support; evidence of underinvestment or missing coordination.	Public money subsidizes activity that would have occurred anyway.
How will capability be demonstrated?	Productivity, quality, exports, supplier learning, innovation, reliability or resilience metrics.	Revenue growth is mistaken for learning; protection persists without competitiveness.
How is competition preserved?	Entry rules, procurement transparency, multiple beneficiaries, challenge mechanisms.	Policy creates entrenched monopoly or patronage.
Who pays and who gains?	Fiscal cost, consumer prices, input costs, regional and labor-market incidence.	Aggregate narratives conceal regressive or spatially concentrated burdens.
How does support end?	Sunset dates, declining schedules, independent review, failure triggers.	Temporary protection becomes permanent entitlement.

Source/Note: Author's synthesis drawing on Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), Juhasz et al. (2024), and World Bank (2026).

PRACTICE TOOL | Industrial policy should be falsifiable

If a policy has no observable milestone by which success or failure could be recognized, it is not yet an accountable economic strategy. Specify what would cause support to scale, change or stop before beneficiaries become politically entrenched.

14.13 Balance of Payments, Saving, Investment and International Capital Flows

14.13.1 What the balance of payments records

The balance of payments (BoP) is a double-entry accounting framework that records economic transactions between residents of an economy and nonresidents over a period. It is often described loosely as a record of "money entering and leaving the country," but that language obscures the accounting structure. An export of goods creates a current-account credit and is matched by a financial claim, payment or other offsetting entry. Every transaction therefore has a counterpart. Statistical discrepancies arise because real-world data come from different sources and timing conventions, not because the accounting identity permits the BoP as a whole to remain unbalanced.

The current account records trade in goods and services, primary income such as investment income and employee compensation, and secondary income such as certain transfers. The capital account, in modern statistical usage, is comparatively small and records capital transfers and transactions in non-produced, non-financial assets. Most cross-border acquisition of financial assets and liabilities appears in the financial account. Business discussion often uses “capital account” informally to mean all financial flows; a careful analyst should distinguish the statistical capital account from the broader concept of international capital flows.

The financial account includes direct investment, portfolio investment, financial derivatives, other investment and reserve assets under the relevant statistical framework. A current-account deficit therefore has a financing counterpart: the economy is, in aggregate, using more foreign resources than it earns through its current transactions and must issue liabilities, sell assets, receive transfers or reduce reserves. The identity alone does not tell us whether the deficit is good or bad. Borrowing to finance high-return investment differs from borrowing to sustain an unsustainable consumption boom, and a current-account surplus can reflect competitive strength, weak domestic investment, demographic saving or macroeconomic stress.

14.13.2 The current account as saving minus investment

National accounting provides the most useful bridge between the current account and domestic saving and investment, but the derivation requires precision. From the GDP expenditure identity $Y = C + I + G + NX$, defining saving from GDP alone gives $NX = S - I$ in the simplified case. The full current account is broader than net exports because it also includes net primary income and net secondary income from abroad. When national saving is defined from gross national disposable income, so that those cross-border income and transfer flows are included, the exact macroeconomic identity is $CA = S - I$. An external deficit therefore means national investment exceeds national saving in the accounting period, while a surplus means saving exceeds investment. The identity does not by itself reveal which behavior caused the gap or whether it is sustainable.

$$CA = S - I$$

With national saving defined from national disposable income, this is an accounting identity. A GDP-only derivation yields $NX = S - I$ when net primary and secondary income from abroad are ignored. The identity does not identify causation or sustainability.

$$CA = (S_{private} - I) + (T - G)$$

A useful decomposition separates the private saving-investment balance from the government fiscal balance. T denotes net taxes in this simplified expression. The identity does not imply one-for-one behavioral causation.

14.13.3 Worked balance-of-payments financing example

Consider a simplified economy with a US\$2.5 billion current-account deficit. If private and official net financial inflows supply US\$2.0 billion, the remaining US\$0.5 billion must be financed through another item such as a reserve draw, capital-account transfer or statistical discrepancy. In a classroom “financing sources” convention, a US\$0.5 billion reserve draw closes the gap. Official BoP presentations can use different signs for financial-account components, so analysts should always read the reporting convention before adding entries mechanically.

Table 14.8. Simplified external financing reconciliation.

External item	Illustrative amount	Economic interpretation
Current account	-US\$2.5bn	Residents purchase more current goods, services and income from abroad than they earn on net.
Net private/official financial inflow	+US\$2.0bn	Foreign claims on the economy increase or residents reduce foreign asset acquisition under this simplified financing convention.
Reserve draw	+US\$0.5bn	The central bank supplies external financing by reducing reserve assets.
Financing gap	US\$0.0bn	The simplified sources and uses reconcile. Real BoP accounts include more detailed categories and errors/omissions.

Source/Note: Author's illustrative example. Signs are presented as financing sources for intuition and should not be substituted for the sign convention used in an official national BoP table.

EVIDENCE CHECK | A current-account deficit is not a diagnosis

The accounting identity tells you how external use of resources is financed; it does not tell you whether the underlying process is sustainable or productive. Diagnose maturity, currency composition, investment quality, reserve adequacy, export capacity, fiscal conditions and the stability of capital flows before labeling a deficit dangerous or a surplus virtuous.

14.13.4 International capital flows: benefits and vulnerability

International capital can finance investment that domestic saving alone would delay, diversify portfolios, transfer technology and support risk sharing. Foreign direct investment may bundle capital with management and market access; portfolio flows can deepen markets; concessional and official finance can support infrastructure or stabilization. The same openness can increase vulnerability to sudden stops, refinancing shocks and global interest-rate changes, especially when liabilities are short-term, foreign-currency denominated or intermediated through weak financial systems.

The composition of flows therefore matters as much as the aggregate amount. A long-horizon equity investor shares more business risk than a short-term foreign-currency creditor with a fixed claim. A country that earns foreign currency from diversified exports is better placed to service external debt than one whose earnings depend on a narrow commodity basket. Capital-flow management and macroprudential policy can sometimes reduce systemic risk, but these instruments also have costs and implementation challenges. Chapter 17 develops corporate financing and settlement choices; Chapter 14 remains at the macroeconomic level.

14.13.5 International investment position, valuation effects and external balance-sheet resilience

The balance of payments is a flow statement. External resilience also depends on stocks. The international investment position (IIP) records the value of residents' financial claims on nonresidents and nonresidents' claims on residents at a point in time. The net international investment position (NIIP) is external financial assets minus external financial liabilities. A negative NIIP means the economy owes more financial claims to the rest of the world than it owns abroad; a positive NIIP means the reverse. The IMF's seventh-edition balance-of-payments and international-investment-position framework, released in 2025 in its white-cover version, integrates these stock and flow accounts precisely because external vulnerability cannot be assessed from the current account alone (IMF, 2025).

$$NIIP = \text{external financial assets} - \text{external financial liabilities}$$

NIIP is a stock measured at a point in time. Changes in NIIP reflect transactions recorded in the financial account plus valuation changes and other adjustments, so NIIP need not change by the current-account balance alone.

Valuation effects are especially important when currencies and asset prices move sharply. If a country's foreign assets are largely denominated in foreign currency while many liabilities are in domestic currency or equity, depreciation can improve the domestic-currency value of its net external position even when the current account is weak. The opposite can occur when governments, banks or firms owe large unhedged foreign-currency debts. Analysts should therefore examine currency denomination, maturity, sector of borrower, liquidity, reserve assets and contingent liabilities alongside headline NIIP. A seemingly modest external-debt ratio can still be fragile if debt is short term and concentrated; a large negative NIIP can be more resilient when liabilities are long-horizon equity rather than callable debt.

EVIDENCE CHECK | Flows and stocks can point in different directions

A current-account deficit is a flow during a period; NIIP is a stock at a date. Valuation changes, asset-price movements, debt restructuring and exchange-rate changes can move the stock independently of current transactions. External sustainability requires both perspectives.

14.14 Exchange Rates: Prices Between Monies and Signals Between Economies

14.14.1 Nominal exchange rates and quotation conventions

An exchange rate is the price of one currency in terms of another. This chapter uses E to mean units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. Under this convention, an increase in E is a nominal depreciation of the domestic currency because more domestic currency is required to buy one unit of foreign currency; a decrease is an appreciation. The convention must always be stated because financial screens frequently quote currencies in the opposite direction.

$$\% \text{ depreciation of domestic currency} = (E_1 - E_0) / E_0 \times 100$$

With E defined as domestic currency per unit of foreign currency, a positive percentage indicates domestic-currency depreciation.

If E rises from 1,300 domestic currency units per US dollar to 1,430, the domestic currency depreciates by $(1,430 - 1,300)/1,300 = 10\%$. An importer who owes US\$100,000 now needs 143 million domestic units rather than 130 million, before considering fees and hedging. An exporter receiving dollars may obtain more domestic currency per dollar, but the net effect depends on imported inputs, foreign debt, pricing currency and demand. Chapter 17 turns these macro price movements into corporate exposure and hedging decisions.

14.14.2 Real exchange rates and competitiveness

The nominal rate alone does not measure international price competitiveness because domestic and foreign price levels also move. Let P be the domestic price level and P^* the foreign price level. With E defined as domestic currency per unit of foreign currency, a common bilateral real exchange rate is $q = E P^* / P$. An increase in q is a real depreciation: foreign goods become more expensive relative to domestic goods after accounting for price levels. A decrease is a real appreciation. Real effective exchange-rate indices extend the idea across a weighted basket of trading partners.

$$q = E P^* / P$$

E is domestic currency per foreign currency; P^ is the foreign price level; P is the domestic price level. Under this convention, q rising means real depreciation.*

A nominal depreciation need not produce a lasting real depreciation. If domestic prices rise rapidly after the currency falls, the initial competitiveness effect can be eroded. This is one reason exchange-rate pass-through matters. It also explains why “devalue to export” is not a complete strategy. Export capacity, imported-input dependence, energy costs, logistics, market access and credibility affect the real response.

14.14.3 Purchasing power parity: an anchor, not a short-run law

Purchasing power parity (PPP) links exchange rates to relative price levels. Absolute PPP states that identical tradable baskets should cost the same when expressed in a common currency if there are no trade costs, taxes, market segmentation or nontradables. Relative PPP weakens the claim: over time, currencies of countries with persistently higher inflation should tend to depreciate relative to lower-inflation countries, other things equal. In approximate form, the rate of nominal depreciation is related to the inflation differential.

$$\% \text{ change in } E \text{ approximately equals domestic inflation} - \text{foreign inflation}$$

Relative PPP is a long-run benchmark. Short-run exchange rates respond to interest rates, risk, capital flows, expectations, interventions and news, so deviations can be large and persistent.

PPP fails as a precise short-run predictor for understandable reasons. Haircuts, rents and many services are not easily traded; transport and border costs create price wedges; product quality differs; taxes and regulation vary; and financial markets reprice currencies much faster than goods markets adjust. PPP is therefore most useful as a long-horizon valuation anchor and consistency check rather than as a mechanical forecast.

14.14.4 Interest parity, expectations and asset-market determination

Exchange rates also clear asset markets. An investor choosing between domestic and foreign assets compares expected returns after allowing for currency movement and risk. A simplified uncovered interest parity intuition is that a higher domestic interest rate relative to a foreign rate must, absent a risk premium and other frictions, be offset by expected domestic-currency depreciation. In practice, risk premia, market segmentation, capital controls, intervention and forecast errors matter, and uncovered parity performs poorly as a short-horizon forecasting rule.

$$i \text{ approximately equals } i^* + \text{expected depreciation} + \text{risk premium}$$

A teaching approximation to uncovered interest parity. The exact relation depends on quotation convention, compounding and asset characteristics.

Dornbusch's (1976) overshooting model explains why exchange rates can react more sharply than goods prices when monetary conditions change. Financial markets adjust quickly; domestic goods prices are stickier. A monetary shock can therefore cause the currency to move beyond its eventual long-run level before gradually returning as prices adjust. The model remains influential because it shows why exchange-rate volatility can be consistent with rational forward-looking behavior rather than evidence that currency markets simply ignore fundamentals.

14.14.5 Exchange-rate pass-through to inflation

Depreciation raises the domestic price of imported final goods and imported inputs, but the extent and speed of pass-through vary. Firms can compress margins, switch suppliers, draw inventories, reprice gradually or invoice in a dominant foreign currency. Competitive structure, inflation expectations, exchange-rate regime, commodity dependence and monetary credibility all shape the response. For Sub-Saharan Africa, Kemoe et al. (2024) estimate average pass-through of roughly 0.22-0.25 percentage point in the consumer price level after one year following a one percentage point increase in the rate of depreciation, rising to about 0.31-0.37 after two years depending on the exchange-rate measure. The paper is an IMF Working Paper and therefore research in progress rather than an official policy position, and averages conceal large country differences.

AFRICAN CONTEXT | Depreciation can help exporters and hurt purchasing power at the same time

Many African production systems use imported fuel, machinery, medicines, fertilizer, digital services or intermediate inputs. A weaker currency can improve the local-currency value of export receipts while raising production and household costs. The net effect depends on invoicing, input shares, market power and inflation expectations. Treat “competitiveness” as a real-economy question, not a nominal exchange-rate slogan.

14.15 Exchange-Rate Regimes, Reserves and the Open-Economy Policy Trilemma

14.15.1 A continuum of exchange-rate arrangements

Exchange-rate regimes range from hard pegs and currency unions through conventional pegs, crawling or adjustable arrangements and managed floats to more freely floating currencies. The economic choice involves a trade-off. A stable nominal rate can lower currency uncertainty and anchor inflation expectations, especially where institutions are credible. It also requires policy adjustment when domestic conditions diverge from the anchor country. A flexible rate can absorb shocks and preserve greater monetary autonomy, but it can be volatile and may transmit depreciation into inflation or debt-service stress.

Table 14.9. Exchange-rate regimes: economic benefits, constraints and failure risks.

Regime family	Potential benefits	Core constraints	Characteristic failure risks
Hard peg / currency board / currency union	High nominal stability; can strengthen a credible nominal anchor; lowers bilateral currency uncertainty.	Domestic monetary policy is tightly constrained; adjustment shifts toward prices, wages, fiscal policy, mobility and transfers.	Reserve or credibility crisis in a peg; prolonged internal adjustment when shocks are asymmetric; loss of lender-of-last-resort flexibility in some designs.
Conventional or crawling peg	More exchange stability while allowing scheduled or occasional adjustment.	Requires reserve management, policy credibility and consistency between domestic inflation and the exchange anchor.	Speculative pressure, discrete devaluation, reserve depletion, delayed adjustment.
Managed float	Allows exchange rate to respond while authorities sometimes smooth disorderly movement.	Intervention needs reserves and a credible framework; market participants may be uncertain about the reaction function.	Using intervention to postpone necessary macro adjustment; quasi-peg without sufficient reserves.
More flexible float	Exchange rate can absorb external shocks; greater monetary-policy autonomy under capital mobility.	Depreciation can pass into inflation; shallow markets can amplify volatility; foreign-currency balance sheets matter.	Overshooting, destabilizing expectations, inflation feedback or excessive reliance on the exchange rate as the only shock absorber.

Source/Note: Author's synthesis. Actual regimes often fall between textbook categories; de facto behavior can differ from announced arrangements.

14.15.2 Foreign-exchange reserves and intervention

Central banks hold reserve assets for several reasons: to settle external obligations, provide liquidity during market stress, support confidence, intervene in foreign-exchange markets and buffer temporary external shocks. Reserve adequacy is therefore a risk-management concept rather than a single target ratio. Import coverage, short-term external debt, broad money, exchange-rate regime, capital-flow volatility and market access all matter. A reserve stock that is ample for a floating, low-debt economy may be inadequate for a heavily managed currency with large short-term foreign liabilities.

Intervention can smooth disorderly markets or address temporary overshooting, but reserves are finite. Selling reserves to defend an inconsistent exchange rate can delay adjustment and worsen the eventual correction. The IMF's April 2026 Sub-Saharan Africa outlook emphasized the distinction: pegged economies need monetary policy aligned with the anchor and may rely more on fiscal and reserve buffers, whereas non-pegged economies with limited reserves may need to allow the exchange rate to adjust, with monetary and fiscal policy containing second-round inflation and protecting vulnerable households (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2026). The advice is institutional and context-dependent, not a universal instruction that every depreciation should be accepted without intervention.

14.15.3 The policy trilemma

The monetary policy trilemma states that a country cannot simultaneously maintain a fixed exchange rate, free capital mobility and fully independent monetary policy. It can choose at most two in strong form. If capital moves freely and the exchange rate is credibly fixed, domestic interest rates are constrained by the anchor currency because arbitrage would otherwise generate capital flows. If the country wants independent monetary policy with open capital markets, the exchange rate must be allowed to move. If it wants both a fixed rate and monetary autonomy, it needs restrictions or frictions on capital mobility. Long historical evidence broadly supports the trilemma as a real constraint, even though modern financial cycles can limit autonomy under floating regimes as well (Obstfeld et al., 2005).




Figure 14.4. The open-economy policy trilemma.

Source/Note: Author's synthesis drawing on Mundell (1961) and Obstfeld et al. (2005). The triangle represents a constraint, not a menu of equally feasible corners for every institutional setting.

MANAGERIAL INSIGHT | Currency stability is purchased with policy trade-offs

A stable exchange rate can simplify pricing and reduce one source of uncertainty for firms, but it does not eliminate macroeconomic risk. The adjustment may reappear through interest rates, credit, fiscal restraint, reserve loss, wages or a later discrete devaluation. Managers should analyze the whole regime, not only the day-to-day volatility of the quoted exchange rate.

14.16 Open-Economy Macroeconomic Policy, External Stability and Global Shocks

14.16.1 Mundell-Fleming intuition: policy depends on the exchange-rate regime

The Mundell-Fleming framework extends short-run Keynesian analysis to an open economy by combining goods-market equilibrium, money-market equilibrium and international capital mobility. Its strongest textbook results rely on simplifying assumptions, including sticky prices and high capital mobility, but the framework is valuable because it makes policy interactions explicit. Under a fixed exchange rate with high capital mobility, an independent monetary expansion tends to create pressure on the peg and is offset by reserve flows, while fiscal expansion can be relatively powerful. Under a floating rate, monetary expansion can depreciate the currency and support net exports, while fiscal expansion can appreciate the currency and crowd out part of the net-export response.

Real economies rarely match the polar cases. Capital mobility can be partial; central banks target inflation rather than money stocks; balance sheets react to exchange rates; fiscal credibility affects risk premia; and expectations matter. The framework should therefore be used as comparative intuition, not as a forecasting machine. Its central lesson remains robust: the same policy instrument can have different external effects depending on the exchange-rate regime and capital-flow environment.

Table 14.10. Open-economy policy intuition under stylized regimes.

Policy action	Flexible exchange rate, high capital mobility	Fixed exchange rate, high capital mobility	Important caveats
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Policy action	Flexible exchange rate, high capital mobility	Fixed exchange rate, high capital mobility	Important caveats
Monetary easing	Tends to lower interest rates and depreciate the currency, supporting net exports in the textbook model.	Creates pressure on the peg; intervention can offset monetary autonomy.	Inflation expectations, FX debt, bank balance sheets, capital-flow response and central-bank credibility can alter outcomes.
Fiscal expansion	Tends to raise interest rates and appreciate the currency, partly crowding out net exports.	Can be more expansionary if the peg accommodates money demand and credibility is maintained.	Debt sustainability, import leakage, financing conditions and risk premia can dominate simple textbook effects.
External demand shock	Exchange rate can act as a partial shock absorber.	Adjustment occurs more through output, reserves, fiscal policy, wages/prices or financing.	Pass-through, labor-market flexibility and financial depth shape actual adjustment.

Source/Note: Stylized Mundell-Fleming intuition. Outcomes depend on monetary frameworks, expectations, balance-sheet effects, capital mobility and institutional credibility.

14.16.2 Depreciation, the Marshall-Lerner condition and the J-curve

A currency depreciation does not automatically improve the trade balance. It raises the domestic-currency price of imports and lowers the foreign-currency price of exports only to the extent firms change prices and quantities respond. The Marshall-Lerner condition states, in a simplified setting, that a real depreciation improves the trade balance if the absolute values of export and import demand elasticities sum to more than one. The condition is about quantities responding sufficiently to relative prices; it is not a guaranteed law for every horizon.

$$|\epsilon_{X}| + |\epsilon_{M}| > 1$$

A simplified Marshall-Lerner condition. The elasticities refer to export and import quantity responses to the relevant relative-price change; invoicing, contracts and intermediate inputs complicate empirical application.

The J-curve describes a common dynamic possibility: immediately after depreciation, contract quantities may change slowly while import prices rise, so the trade balance can worsen before improving as exporters and importers adjust volumes. Whether a J-curve appears depends on invoicing currency, contract duration, production capacity, demand elasticity and the composition of trade. A country that imports essential energy and capital goods may have limited short-run substitution even if longer-run responses are stronger.

14.16.3 Inflation, debt and balance-sheet effects

Exchange-rate movements can also redistribute through balance sheets. A government, bank or firm that earns domestic currency but owes foreign currency becomes more leveraged in domestic-currency terms when the domestic currency depreciates. The resulting debt-service pressure can offset export gains and tighten credit. This “original sin” problem has historically made currency depreciation more contractionary in economies with substantial unhedged foreign-currency liabilities. The correct macro diagnosis therefore joins flow effects on trade with stock effects on debt and assets.

Inflation creates a second channel. If depreciation raises imported prices and expectations become unanchored, monetary policy may tighten, reducing domestic demand. Where food, fuel and transport occupy a large share of household budgets, the welfare effect can be strongly regressive even if export sectors benefit. A responsible stabilization program should therefore distinguish temporary first-round imported inflation from persistent second-round dynamics while designing targeted support that does not destroy the fiscal or monetary anchor.

14.16.4 Fiscal policy, public debt and external shocks

Open-economy fiscal policy is constrained by the state's financing structure. A commodity exporter may receive a fiscal windfall when export prices rise and face a sudden revenue collapse when they fall. A net energy importer faces the opposite terms-of-trade pressure. External interest-rate increases can raise sovereign borrowing costs and induce capital outflows. High debt service reduces the fiscal room available for infrastructure, adjustment support or countercyclical spending. These interactions became especially visible in the 2026 outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa.

The IMF estimated regional growth at 4.5% in 2025 and projected 4.3% for 2026 in its April 2026 Regional Economic Outlook, while the World Bank projected 4.1% in its April 2026 Africa Economic Update. The difference does not imply that one institution must be wrong; forecasts use different model vintages, country coverage, assumptions and cut-off dates. Both highlighted downside risks from the Middle East conflict, fuel and fertilizer prices, debt vulnerabilities and weak job creation (IMF, 2026; World Bank, 2026). This is an important evidence lesson: a professional should compare forecast definitions and dates before treating a point estimate as fact.

EVIDENCE CHECK | Forecasts are conditional scenarios with publication dates

When using macroeconomic forecasts, record the institution, release date, variable definition and forecast vintage. A projection can become obsolete within weeks after a commodity, conflict, policy or data shock. Comparing sources is useful when differences are interpreted, not averaged away.

14.17 Regional Integration: From Preferential Trade to Deeper Economic Coordination

14.17.1 Degrees of integration are institutional choices, not moral rankings

Regional economic integration reduces selected barriers among participating economies and, at deeper levels, coordinates external trade policy, factor mobility or macroeconomic institutions. Balassa (1961) organized integration as a progression from free trade

through customs unions and common markets toward deeper economic integration. The taxonomy remains useful, but the stages should not be treated as an inevitable ladder of political progress. A deeper arrangement can lower transaction costs and improve coordination, yet it also requires greater trust, administrative capability and shared authority. The appropriate depth depends on the problem being solved, the heterogeneity of members and the legitimacy of the institutions that exercise pooled powers.

INCREASING DEPTH CAN LOWER INTERNAL FRICTIONS - BUT ALSO REQUIRES MORE COORDINATION



Depth is not a moral ranking. The economically appropriate level depends on benefits, capacity, legitimacy, sovereignty and shock-sharing institutions.

Figure 14.5. A conceptual ladder of regional economic integration.

Source/Note: Author's synthesis drawing on Balassa (1961). The sequence indicates increasing policy depth, not a normative claim that every region should pursue the deepest form.

A preferential arrangement reduces selected barriers for members. A free trade area removes tariffs on qualifying internal trade while members retain their own external tariffs. This creates a need for rules of origin because otherwise goods could enter through the member with the lowest external tariff and circulate freely. A customs union adds a common external tariff, reducing the internal rules-of-origin problem but requiring joint external tariff policy. A common market adds broader mobility of factors such as labor and capital. Economic and monetary unions go further by coordinating policy or sharing a currency. The legal design of these arrangements belongs to Chapter 19; Chapter 14 asks what economic mechanisms they create.

14.17.2 Trade creation and trade diversion

Viner (1950) established the classic distinction between trade creation and trade diversion. Trade creation occurs when integration causes a member to replace higher-cost domestic production with lower-cost imports from a partner. This tends to improve allocative efficiency. Trade diversion occurs when a preference causes the member to switch from a lower-cost non-member supplier to a higher-cost partner merely because the external tariff makes the partner cheaper after policy. Diversion can therefore reduce efficiency even though intra-regional trade rises. This is why a higher share of regional trade is not itself a welfare measure.

Consider a product that costs US\$80 from the lowest-cost global supplier, US\$90 from a regional partner and US\$110 domestically. Before integration, a 20% tariff on all imports makes the global product cost US\$96 and the partner product US\$108, so the country imports globally. After forming a free trade area that removes the tariff on the partner while leaving the global tariff, the partner price falls to US\$90 and sourcing shifts regionally. Domestic consumers pay US\$6 less than before, but the economy now uses a supplier whose real resource cost is US\$10 higher than the global alternative and loses tariff revenue previously collected on global imports. Whether welfare rises depends on the consumer gain, revenue loss and quantity responses. The example shows why trade diversion is a real possibility without implying that every regional preference is harmful.

Table 14.11. Trade creation versus trade diversion.

Mechanism	Before integration	After preferential integration	Economic interpretation
Trade creation	High-cost domestic production survives behind the tariff.	Lower-cost partner production replaces domestic production.	Real resource cost falls; consumers typically gain, though producers and tariff revenue may lose.
Trade diversion	Imports come from a lower-cost external supplier despite the common tariff.	Preference shifts sourcing to a higher-cost partner.	Regional trade rises, but real sourcing cost rises relative to the best global supplier; welfare can fall after tariff-revenue effects.
Mixed case	Domestic and multiple foreign suppliers coexist.	Both domestic contraction and partner switching occur.	Actual agreements usually combine creation, diversion, scale, competition and dynamic effects; empirical evaluation is required.

Source/Note: Author's synthesis drawing on Viner (1950).

14.17.3 Dynamic gains: scale, competition, investment and networks

Vinerian analysis is static. Regional integration can also alter market size, competitive intensity, investment location, infrastructure coordination and supplier networks. A firm that could not justify a plant for a market of ten million consumers may invest when it can serve one hundred million under predictable regional rules. Larger markets can support more specialized suppliers and lower fixed cost per unit. Greater competition can reduce markups and accelerate exit of inefficient firms. Cross-border infrastructure can create network externalities that no single country would capture alone.

These dynamic gains are not automatic. Integration may concentrate production in the largest or best-connected centers, increasing regional inequality. Large incumbents can use a wider market to entrench dominance. Investment can be attracted by tax competition rather than productivity. Infrastructure can favor political prestige over high-return corridors. The economic case for

integration therefore includes both the size of potential network gains and the quality of regional institutions that choose and implement common policies.

14.17.4 Deep integration, standards and regulatory cooperation

As tariffs fall, internal trade costs increasingly reflect regulation, logistics, professional licensing, competition rules, data procedures and border administration. “Deep integration” attempts to reduce these frictions. Full harmonization is one approach, but not the only one. Mutual recognition can allow a product or professional qualification accepted in one member state to be accepted in another under agreed safeguards. Equivalence can recognize different rules that achieve comparable outcomes. Interoperability can connect systems without making them identical. These distinctions matter for sovereignty and administrative cost.

Economic benefits arise when coordination removes duplicative or arbitrary costs and enlarges trustworthy market access. Costs arise when harmonization imposes rules poorly suited to local conditions, centralizes decisions without adequate accountability, or creates compliance burdens that favor large firms. Regulatory integration should therefore be justified by the cross-border problem it solves, the evidence that coordination improves outcomes, and the subsidiarity question: which decisions require regional action and which can remain legitimately local?

14.18 Monetary Integration, Optimum Currency Areas, Sovereignty and Subsidiarity

14.18.1 Why share a currency?

A shared currency eliminates nominal exchange-rate uncertainty among members, reduces some transaction and conversion costs, increases price transparency and may deepen financial and trade integration. It can also provide a credible nominal anchor where the common monetary institution is trusted. The benefit is greatest when members trade heavily with one another and when exchange-rate volatility imposes material costs. The cost is the loss of national monetary policy and nominal exchange-rate adjustment in response to country-specific shocks.

Optimum-currency-area theory developed through complementary criteria rather than one mechanical test. Mundell (1961) emphasized factor mobility: if workers and capital can move from a depressed member toward expanding locations, mobility can substitute partly for exchange-rate adjustment. McKinnon (1963) emphasized openness: where tradable goods dominate economic activity and members trade heavily with one another, the transaction gains from exchange-rate stability can be larger and domestic prices more tightly linked to external prices. Kenen (1969) emphasized production diversification and fiscal risk sharing: a diversified economy is less exposed to a narrow sectoral shock, while common fiscal capacity can cushion asymmetric regional disturbances. Later work adds business-cycle synchronization, financial integration, wage and price flexibility, credible institutions and political legitimacy. These are interacting criteria for judgment, not a checklist that can be satisfied once and forgotten.

$$\text{Net value of monetary union} = \text{transaction/stability gains} - \text{loss of adjustment instruments} - \text{governance/fiscal-risk costs}$$

This is a conceptual decision equation, not an estimable identity. The relative magnitude of each term depends on trade intensity, shock symmetry, mobility, fiscal institutions, financial integration and political legitimacy.

14.18.2 Endogeneity and the sequencing problem

Some OCA characteristics can themselves be affected by integration. A currency union may increase trade, investment and financial integration, causing business cycles to become more synchronized. Alternatively, deeper specialization can make members more exposed to sector-specific shocks. This creates an endogeneity problem: regions may become more or less suitable for a shared currency after they share one. Sequencing therefore matters. Institutions for banking stability, fiscal discipline, statistics, payment systems, crisis management and legitimate political accountability can be as important as the headline convergence criteria.

14.18.3 Sovereignty and subsidiarity as economic variables

Sovereignty is often treated as a purely political concept, but integration changes the economic value of national discretion. A common external tariff constrains unilateral trade policy; a currency union constrains national monetary policy; regional competition rules constrain certain subsidies; shared standards can constrain national regulation. These constraints may be valuable when they prevent beggar-thy-neighbor policies, increase credibility or solve cross-border externalities. They may be costly when the common rule is poorly fitted to local conditions or when citizens cannot effectively hold regional authorities accountable.

Subsidiarity offers a disciplined way to frame the problem. Decisions should remain at the lowest level capable of addressing the relevant externality or coordination problem, unless a higher level creates demonstrable value that cannot be achieved locally. The principle does not imply small government or large government by default. It asks for a reasoned match between the scale of the problem and the scale of authority. In regional economics, that means distinguishing problems that genuinely cross borders - such as transit corridors, customs interoperability or a shared currency - from policies whose local variation may be economically useful.

FAITH AND VOCATION | Shared authority does not remove moral accountability

Pooling economic authority can be prudent when it serves cooperation, peace, predictable exchange and the common good. It can also distance decisions from those who bear their costs. Christian moral reasoning therefore treats both sovereignty and cooperation as forms of accountable stewardship, not as absolute ends. The question is whether authority is exercised truthfully, justly, proportionately and with due regard for persons and communities.

14.19 African Regional Integration in Comparative Economic Perspective

African integration is best understood as a layered architecture rather than a single project. Continental AfCFTA implementation sits alongside long-standing regional economic communities whose memberships, depth and institutional trajectories differ. Overlapping memberships can broaden market access and create bridges between regions; they can also multiply tariff schedules,

origin requirements, reporting systems and institutional obligations. The economic task is to identify which layer actually changes the cost or feasibility of trade for a particular product, firm or corridor.

Table 14.12. Selected African integration arrangements: economic architecture and current implementation signals.

Arrangement	Economic depth / current signal	Economic opportunity	Key analytical caution
AfCFTA	Continental free trade area; trading under the first phase began in 2021, with tariff liberalization and services integration intended to deepen progressively.	Continental scale, wider sourcing, reduced fragmentation, regional value chains and greater bargaining weight.	Implementation is uneven; projections depend on complementary reforms, productive capacity, logistics, finance and utilization.
EAC	Eight Partner States. Customs Union in force since 2005; Common Market since 2010; Monetary Union Protocol signed in 2013; deeper political integration remains aspirational.	Relatively deep integration, factor mobility, regional supply networks and coordinated infrastructure.	Expansion increases heterogeneity; non-tariff barriers and implementation gaps remain; monetary integration requires OCA and institutional analysis.
ECOWAS	Regional community with trade-liberalization and mobility arrangements; Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger withdrew effective 29 January 2025, while transitional continuity measures remained in place until modalities are determined.	Market access, mobility and long-standing regional institutions in West Africa.	Political withdrawal shows that economic arrangements are contingent on legitimacy, security and interstate politics; status can change.
SADC	Sixteen Member States; FTA achieved in 2008 with 85% of intra-regional trade among participating states reaching zero duty at the milestone; services liberalization has progressed separately.	Southern African market integration, value chains, services and corridor cooperation.	Trade intensity and industrial concentration vary widely; zero duty does not remove transport, standards or border frictions.
COMESA	FTA established in 2000; COMESA reported 16 Member States participating in the FTA as of April 2026, with others at different tariff-reduction stages.	Large eastern and southern African market, trade facilitation and a platform for bridging overlapping blocs.	Different participation levels and overlapping memberships complicate simple “member/non-member” analysis.

Sources/Notes: COMESA (2026); East African Community (n.d., 2026); ECOWAS Commission (2025); SADC (n.d.); Echandi et al. (2022). The table summarizes economic architecture, not the legal rights and obligations analyzed in Chapter 19. Time-sensitive status is stated as of the cited sources.

The table immediately reveals why “African integration” is not a single treatment. The EAC has moved through a customs union and common market and has a monetary-union protocol; AfCFTA is a continent-wide free trade project whose effective depth depends on implementation; SADC and COMESA have different trade architectures; and ECOWAS experienced a major membership shock in 2025. Economic evidence must therefore be matched to the actual institutional margin being changed. A study of tariff preferences in a free trade area does not identify the effect of factor mobility in a common market, and a study of regional trade values does not isolate the effect of monetary cooperation.

14.20 AfCFTA: From Formal Liberalization to Real Economic Integration

THE AFCFTA MECHANISM: AN AGREEMENT IS AN INPUT, NOT THE OUTCOME



Macroeconomic stability • infrastructure • competition • finance • skills • standards • credible implementation • adjustment support

Figure 14.6. The AfCFTA mechanism: an agreement is an input, not the outcome.

Source/Note: Author's synthesis. The figure distinguishes formal liberalization from the complementary mechanisms required for productivity, value-chain development and structural transformation.

14.20.1 Tariff preferences are the beginning of the mechanism

AfCFTA can change incentives by lowering tariffs and reducing barriers to services and investment over time, but preferences affect behavior only when firms can use them. Utilization depends on whether products qualify under origin rules, whether documentation is predictable, whether traders know the preference exists and whether the administrative saving exceeds compliance cost. For small consignments, a modest tariff preference can be economically irrelevant if obtaining proof of origin is expensive or slow. This is why preference utilization rates, border time and firm participation are more informative implementation indicators than ratification alone.

14.20.2 The “real trade cost” agenda

UNCTAD's evidence that transport and non-tariff costs loom larger than ordinary tariffs in much intra-African trade directs attention to the real cost of moving a product from seller to buyer. That cost includes transport, storage, insurance, border time, uncertainty, inspection, standards compliance, finance, currency conversion, information and the cost of unreliable infrastructure. Chapter 11 developed these elements operationally; Chapter 14 treats them as wedges that shape equilibrium trade and the location of production. Lower real trade costs expand the range of goods for which regional exchange is viable and can change comparative advantage by making time-sensitive or intermediate-goods trade possible.

14.20.3 Model projections versus observed outcomes

AfCFTA impact estimates commonly use computable general equilibrium models or structural gravity frameworks. These models are valuable because they impose economy-wide consistency and can simulate counterfactual policies that have not yet been fully implemented. They are also assumption-sensitive. Results depend on trade elasticities, baseline data, tariff schedules, non-tariff cost reductions, labor mobility, investment response and closure rules. The World Bank's 2022 estimate of up to 9% higher regional income by 2035 under deep implementation should therefore be read as a conditional scenario, not a forecast with a confidence interval in the ordinary statistical sense (Echandi et al., 2022).

Observed trade data pose the opposite problem. They are real outcomes but include many simultaneous causes. Afreximbank's US\$220.3 billion estimate for intra-African trade in 2024 documents a strong rebound but does not isolate AfCFTA. The best policy learning combines both types of evidence: models to clarify mechanisms and counterfactuals, observed administrative and firm data to monitor implementation, and causal or quasi-causal designs where policy variation permits credible identification.

EVIDENCE CHECK | Do not call a projection an achievement

A modeled 2035 income gain is evidence about a scenario, not evidence that the gain has occurred. An observed rise in 2024 intra-African trade is evidence about realized trade value, not proof that the agreement caused it. Publication-quality analysis labels the evidential status of each number.

14.20.4 Payments, currencies and the economics of settlement

Cross-border trade can be constrained when two firms must route payment through a third currency, bear conversion spreads or obtain scarce foreign exchange. Regional payment interoperability can reduce transaction frictions and the demand for vehicle currencies in some transactions. The economic mechanism is straightforward: lower settlement cost can make smaller transactions viable and reduce working-capital delay. The institutional and technical details of payment systems, trade finance and corporate settlement belong to Chapter 17; here the key point is that tariff liberalization can be undermined by monetary and payments frictions.

14.20.5 Integration and policy space

A continental market creates value partly by making policy commitments more predictable. Predictability can attract investment because firms expect market access to persist. The same commitment reduces unilateral discretion. A government may find it harder to raise a tariff quickly, impose a discriminatory restriction or subsidize a favored activity without affecting partners. Whether this is a benefit or cost depends on the quality of the common rule, the externalities involved and the accountability of regional decision-making. The economically serious position is neither “policy space at any cost” nor “harmonization at any cost.” It is to identify which discretion is valuable for legitimate experimentation and which discretion imposes costs on neighbors or invites capture.

14.21 Trade, Regional Value Chains and African Structural Transformation

14.21.1 Regional markets can be laboratories for industrial learning

Regional value chains divide production across countries while keeping a significant share of sourcing, processing or final demand within the region. They can be especially important where firms are not yet globally competitive but can meet the scale, quality or logistics requirements of neighboring markets. UNCTAD's finding that a majority of intra-African exports in its structural assessment were processed or semi-processed supports the idea that regional trade has a different composition from many extra-African commodity exports (UNCTAD, 2025). This does not prove superior productivity, but it does suggest that regional demand can support value addition and supplier learning.

Krantz's (2025) EAC evidence sharpens the mechanism. The region is moderately integrated into regional and global value chains, and deeper forward manufacturing linkages are associated with stronger development outcomes. Regional integration in agriculture and food processing has advanced more clearly than aggregate indicators alone would suggest. These sectoral patterns matter because structural transformation occurs through activities and firms, not through an aggregate trade share. A policy that raises intra-regional trade in raw commodities has different capability implications from one that builds engineering, packaging, cold-chain, business-service or component linkages.

14.21.2 Export diversification and economic resilience

Diversification can reduce vulnerability to commodity-specific price shocks and create learning across a broader productive base. Vogel (2025) finds that structural characteristics strongly shape African export diversification and that regional integration and tariff conditions also matter, with effects varying by context. The policy implication is not simply “export more products.” Diversification that rests on persistent subsidy without productivity can consume resources without building resilience. More durable diversification involves capabilities that survive changing demand: reliable infrastructure, technical skills, quality systems, logistics, finance, competitive firms and institutions that allow discovery and exit.

14.21.3 Global value chains: participation versus upgrading

Global value-chain participation is not a single development stage. An economy may enter a chain through low-value assembly, raw material supply, logistics, design, digital services or specialized components. “Upgrading” can mean moving into higher-value functions, improving process productivity, developing more complex products or increasing domestic linkages. Participation can create jobs and learning even at modest value added, while a policy obsession with domestic content can make production uncompetitive if local inputs are not yet reliable. The economically relevant question is how the current position generates learning and whether firms can progressively capture more value without cutting themselves off from efficient inputs.

14.21.4 Comparative advantage is endogenous to capability, but capability is not created by decree

African economic transformation requires holding two truths together. First, current comparative advantage reflects present productivity, infrastructure and institutions and therefore provides real information about opportunity cost. Second, those determinants are not fixed. Investments in skills, power, transport, digital systems, management and supplier networks can alter future comparative advantage. Industrial policy is most credible when it accelerates such capability accumulation rather than simply changing relative prices at the border.

The distinction helps avoid two policy extremes. Passive specialization can trap firms in low-learning activities if coordination failures and externalities are severe. Indiscriminate protection can trap consumers and downstream firms in high-cost structures if capability does not improve. Transformation policy should therefore couple selective intervention with exposure to performance tests, regional and global competition, and honest measurement of learning.

14.21.5 Institutional and cultural consequences of deeper integration


Trade and integration alter more than product prices. They can reshape where people work and live, which languages and technical standards become commercially valuable, how cities and border corridors develop, which foods and consumer goods become ordinary, and which institutions mediate access to opportunity. Labor mobility can enlarge freedom and transfer knowledge across borders, while also separating households for long periods or accelerating the loss of scarce skills from weaker regions. Regional standards can reduce arbitrary exclusion, yet they can also privilege firms already able to bear certification costs. Digital and logistics platforms can connect small producers to new markets while shifting bargaining power toward the intermediaries that control data, ranking, payment or access. These consequences are not reasons to reject integration; they are part of the incidence that rigorous economics must identify.

Institutional change likewise has path dependence. Repeated cross-border exchange can build habits of trust, professional networks and administrative cooperation, but it can also displace local arrangements before reliable substitutes exist. Cultural adaptation can be voluntary learning and creative exchange, or it can become coercive when economically powerful actors make market access conditional on unnecessary conformity. The professional task is therefore to distinguish productive standardization from avoidable homogenization, and openness from the erosion of legitimate local agency. Chapter 7 developed cross-cultural management at the organizational level; here the concern is economy-wide: whether integration enlarges people's practical choices and productive capability while preserving accountable institutions, family and community resilience, and freedom of conscience.

14.22 Substantial African Case: The East African Community and the Economics of Deepening a Regional Market

The East African Community is analytically valuable because it combines several stages of integration within one living institutional project. The contemporary EAC has eight Partner States: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania. Its institutional milestones include a Customs Union launched in 2005, a Common Market that entered into force in 2010 and an East African Monetary Union Protocol signed in 2013; the EAC also retains a longer-term political-integration aspiration (East African Community, n.d.). From an economics perspective, this depth creates a natural laboratory for examining what tariff reduction can and cannot accomplish when goods, people, services, capital, infrastructure and monetary ambitions interact.

The EAC Secretariat reported that intra-EAC trade increased from US\$14.2 billion in June 2024 to US\$18.0 billion in June 2025, a 27% rise, while total EAC trade with the rest of the world increased from US\$115.4 billion to US\$140.8 billion over the same reported comparison (East African Community, 2026). These are institutional trade-value signals. They support the conclusion that regional exchange grew strongly in the reported period, but they do not identify how much was caused by the Customs Union, Common Market, market expansion, commodity-price changes, post-shock recovery, bilateral policy or statistical revisions. The proper causal question requires a counterfactual.



EAC Secretariat reports a 27% increase; figures are institutional reporting, not causal estimates of integration effects.

Figure 14.7. Reported intra-EAC trade: June 2024 to June 2025.

Source/Note: East African Community (2026). The Secretariat reports a rise from US\$14.2 billion to US\$18.0 billion. Values are institutional reporting and should not be interpreted as a causal estimate of the effect of EAC integration.

14.22.1 Integration is sectoral, not merely aggregate

Krantz (2025) provides the deeper evidence needed to interpret such aggregates. Using detailed trade and multi-region input-output data, the study finds that EAC economies are moderately integrated into global and regional value chains but do not display a uniform trend toward greater overall integration in the historical period studied. Agriculture and food processing show clearer regional deepening, while Kenya increasingly appears as a regional supplier of manufactured products. Reduced-form evidence indicates that trade and value-chain integration have positive development effects, with particularly important gains from deeper forward manufacturing linkages. This suggests that regional integration can matter through specific production networks even when headline integration indices move slowly.

The sectoral view also exposes asymmetry. A manufacturing hub can gain scale when it serves neighbors, while a smaller partner may gain through cheaper inputs, consumer variety, transit services or supplier niches. Those are genuine gains, but they are not the same gains. If production becomes heavily concentrated, political support for integration can weaken unless other members experience credible opportunity to build complementary capabilities. Regional development therefore requires more than equal tariff schedules. It requires corridor reliability, infrastructure interconnection, competitive markets, skills, finance and transparent rules that allow firms in different locations to enter regional value chains.

14.22.2 The Common Market and factor mobility

A common market aims to reduce barriers not only to goods but also to labor, services and capital. Factor mobility can improve allocation by allowing workers to move toward opportunity and capital toward higher returns. It can also facilitate knowledge transfer and cross-border entrepreneurship. Adjustment costs remain real: destination labor markets can face pressure, source regions can lose scarce skills, professional qualification systems may not align, and public services can experience uneven burdens. The economic objective should therefore be mobility that enlarges productive opportunity while preserving fair treatment, professional standards and legitimate national capacity.

14.22.3 Monetary union: the OCA test remains prior to the timetable

The EAC's monetary-union ambition must be evaluated with optimum-currency-area logic rather than symbolic regionalism. Members differ in economic structure, fiscal capacity, financial depth, inflation history, external exposure and exchange-rate arrangements. A single currency would remove intra-regional exchange-rate risk but also remove national monetary and nominal exchange-rate adjustment. Before such a trade-off is favorable, policymakers need credible convergence, statistics, financial supervision, crisis-management institutions and political acceptance of the fiscal and distributive consequences of asymmetric shocks. A missed timetable is therefore not merely administrative delay; it can reflect the difficulty of building the institutions that make monetary integration resilient.

14.22.4 Non-tariff barriers as the implementation frontier

The EAC's own 2025 trade communication emphasized persistent non-tariff barriers even as trade values rose. This is consistent with the broader UNCTAD finding that administrative and technical frictions can exceed tariff costs across Africa. The economic test is operational: how many hours and documents does a shipment require, how predictable is treatment, how often are roadblocks or inspections duplicated, how quickly are disputes resolved, and can small traders understand the requirements? Progress on these margins is likely to determine whether formal integration converts into extensive-margin participation by more firms.

Table 14.13. EAC case: evidence, mechanism and unresolved question.

Case signal	Economic mechanism	What the evidence supports	Unresolved question for decision makers
Intra-EAC trade +27% to US\$18bn in the reported June 2024-June 2025 comparison	Larger internal exchange can reflect lower trade costs, demand growth and market expansion.	Strong reported growth in regional trade value.	How much is causal integration effect versus macro, price, composition and bilateral factors?
Customs Union + Common Market	Tariff coordination plus movement of goods, people, services and capital can lower multiple transaction costs.	Institutional depth exceeds a simple FTA.	Which implementation frictions still bind most strongly at sector and corridor level?
Agriculture and food-processing RVC deepening in Krantz (2025)	Regional demand and supplier links can support processing, learning and forward linkages.	Sector-specific evidence of meaningful regional integration.	How can smaller and landlocked members capture durable value rather than only consume regionally produced goods?
Monetary-union aspiration	Shared currency can reduce transaction costs but removes independent monetary/exchange adjustment.	A clear institutional ambition requiring OCA analysis.	Are shock symmetry, mobility, fiscal/financial institutions and political legitimacy sufficient for resilient union?

Sources/Notes: East African Community (n.d., 2026); Krantz (2025).

MANAGERIAL INSIGHT | Regional integration creates operating options before it creates uniformity

A firm serving the EAC should not assume that a common regional architecture makes eight national markets operationally identical. Tariffs, mobility and institutional commitments can lower barriers, but currencies, infrastructure, consumer income, tax administration, regulatory implementation and local capabilities still differ. Chapter 15 will convert this macro environment into firm-level internationalization and configuration choices.

14.23 Comparative Global Case: The European Single Market, Monetary Integration and the Economics of Disintegration

The European Union offers a useful comparison because its Single Market is far deeper than a conventional free trade area. The European Commission describes a market of about 450 million people and roughly €18 trillion in GDP. Its 2025 Single Market strategy estimates that integration has raised EU GDP by about 3-4% and created 3.6 million jobs, while acknowledging persistent internal barriers (European Commission, 2025b). These are Commission estimates and should be treated as institutional economic assessments rather than uncontested causal facts. More directly observed indicators show that intra-EU trade in goods represented 23.8% of EU GDP in 2023 and intra-EU services trade 7.6%, demonstrating both the depth of goods integration and the continuing relative fragmentation of services (European Commission, 2025a).

The European case clarifies the cumulative nature of integration. Removal of internal tariffs is only one layer. Product standards, competition policy, freedom of movement, services rules, public procurement, financial institutions and, for the euro area, a common currency all affect the effective size of the market. The benefits include scale, reduced duplication and lower border frictions. The costs include the administrative and political challenge of common rules across diverse economies and the loss of some national discretion. The euro-area sovereign-debt crisis demonstrated that monetary integration without equivalent national exchange-rate adjustment places greater weight on fiscal institutions, banking systems, wage and price adjustment and interstate risk sharing.

14.23.1 Brexit as a natural experiment in raising trade frictions

The United Kingdom's exit from the EU creates an unusually informative case of economic disintegration because it increased trade frictions between economies that had previously been deeply integrated. Kren and Lawless (2024) use product-level data and alternative comparison groups to estimate the trade effect. Their preferred analysis suggests that Brexit reduced EU-UK goods trade by close to 20% in both directions. Importantly, the paper also documents how estimates change when the counterfactual and data source change, including breaks in trade measurement. That methodological transparency is part of the lesson: even a large institutional shock does not yield one self-interpreting number.

Brexit does not prove that every region should pursue deeper integration. The UK and EU began from decades of unusually deep regulatory, supply-chain and institutional connection. The estimated cost of raising frictions in that setting can be large precisely because firms had organized around low internal barriers. A less-integrated region may initially have fewer established cross-border networks to disrupt, while also possessing larger unrealized gains from lowering barriers. Institutional history therefore changes the marginal effect of integration and disintegration.

14.23.2 Lessons for African integration without copying Europe

Europe is not a template for Africa. The continents differ in income levels, demographics, state capacity, transport geography, industrial structures, colonial legacies, monetary systems and political institutions. The useful comparison is analytical. First, deep trade integration requires continuous work on non-tariff and services barriers after tariffs fall. Second, supply chains adapt to institutions, so reversing integration can impose real adjustment costs. Third, monetary integration requires shock-sharing and financial institutions, not only political aspiration. Fourth, deeper common rules can create scale while also raising subsidiarity and accountability questions.

For Africa, the implication is to build integration around African economic mechanisms rather than borrowed institutional aesthetics. Corridors, energy pools, digital interoperability, standards, payments, agricultural processing, services mobility and regional manufacturing networks should be evaluated by observed bottlenecks and productive opportunity. The appropriate depth of common authority should be justified function by function.

Table 14.14. EAC/AfCFTA and EU comparison: useful analogies and limits.

Dimension	African integration insight	EU comparison	Limit of analogy
Market scale	AfCFTA can aggregate many smaller national markets; EAC already combines tariff and factor-mobility ambitions.	Single Market demonstrates how lower internal frictions can support large-scale production and trade.	Starting income, industrial depth, infrastructure and institutional capacity differ substantially.
Non-tariff barriers	Standards, borders, logistics and administrative costs can dominate tariff savings.	Services and regulatory barriers remain policy concerns even after decades of integration.	EU harmonization capacity and enforcement institutions are much deeper and more resourced.
Monetary integration	EAC monetary ambition requires OCA and fiscal/financial institution tests.	Euro removes intra-area nominal exchange rates but shifts adjustment toward other mechanisms.	EAC shock structure, financial depth and fiscal institutions differ; sequencing cannot be copied.
Disintegration risk	Regional supply chains become more valuable as firms invest around stable access.	Brexit evidence shows that raising frictions after deep integration can reduce trade substantially.	Brexit estimates concern a unique institutional history and cannot be transferred numerically to Africa.
Sovereignty / subsidiarity	Integration should pool only powers needed to solve cross-border problems.	EU debate illustrates persistent tension between common rules and national discretion.	Political legitimacy and constitutional structures differ; economic lessons do not determine political design.

Sources/Notes: East African Community (n.d.); European Commission (2025a, 2025b); Kren and Lawless (2024); Echandi et al. (2022).

14.24 Faith, Ethics and Moral Reasoning: Trade, Integration and the Human Purpose of Economic Exchange

International economics is often taught as though efficiency settles the moral question. It does not. Comparative advantage can show that exchange enlarges feasible consumption; welfare analysis can estimate gains and losses; macroeconomics can identify external constraints. None of these methods determines whose losses deserve priority, which political authority may legitimately bind a community, what duties accompany prosperity, or whether a profitable pattern of specialization degrades persons or institutions. Those are moral questions. Christian moral reasoning enters precisely at that boundary, not as a substitute for economics but as an account of the human goods that economic systems should serve.

14.24.1 Truth is a precondition of economic judgment

Biblical moral reasoning begins with truth. The prohibition of dishonest measurement in [Proverbs 11:1](#) bears directly on trade statistics, customs valuation, subsidy claims, exchange-rate reporting and policy forecasts. A government, firm or regional institution that manipulates data to manufacture success violates more than technical best practice; it corrupts the information on which other persons make consequential decisions. The same principle requires analysts to distinguish a model projection from an observed result and a correlation from a causal effect.

Truthfulness also disciplines advocacy. A trade association may legitimately argue that a tariff protects employment, but it should disclose the consumer and input costs it expects others to bear. A ministry may legitimately promote AfCFTA implementation, but it should not report conditional 2035 model gains as present achievements. An integration skeptic may legitimately emphasize adjustment costs, but should not suppress evidence of consumer, export or productivity gains. Moral seriousness requires the same evidential standard for claims that support one's preferred policy and claims that challenge it.

14.24.2 Human dignity means persons are not adjustment residuals

Christian ethics treats persons as bearers of God-given dignity rather than as units of labor or consumption. The command to love one's neighbor in [Mark 12:31](#) does not prescribe a tariff schedule, but it changes what counts as responsible policy. Workers displaced by import competition, households exposed to food-price shocks, informal traders facing border harassment and small firms excluded by complex standards are not statistical noise around an aggregate welfare gain. Their interests must enter the design, sequencing and remediation of policy.

This principle should not be converted into an argument against change. Protecting every incumbent job indefinitely can deny dignity to consumers priced out of essential goods, young people excluded from more productive employment, entrepreneurs denied inputs and future workers burdened by inefficient systems. Human dignity requires a wider temporal and relational view: protect persons through transition without treating existing production structures as sacred. The moral object is not the preservation of every current market position but the just treatment and genuine agency of people whose lives are affected by restructuring.

14.24.3 Justice: aggregate gain, distribution and the claims of the vulnerable

Scripture repeatedly condemns economic arrangements that exploit those with less power. [James 5:4](#) condemns withheld wages, while [Proverbs 31:8-9](#) calls for defense of those without effective voice. Applied to international economics, these principles require attention to incidence: who receives cheaper imports, who gains export demand, who loses employment, who pays a subsidy, whose land or livelihood is disrupted by an export corridor, and who has access to the institutions that allocate adjustment support.

Alternative ethical traditions raise related questions through different foundations. Utilitarian reasoning asks whether total well-being rises; rights-based approaches ask whether basic liberties, property or due process are violated; Rawlsian justice emphasizes the position of the least advantaged and fair institutions; Sen's capability approach evaluates whether people gain substantive freedom to live lives they have reason to value; communitarian approaches emphasize social membership, local institutions and obligations that abstract welfare aggregation can miss. These perspectives do not yield identical policy answers, but they expose dimensions that a narrow efficiency metric can hide.

14.24.4 Stewardship, productivity and the moral legitimacy of profit

Christian stewardship supports productive use of resources. Waste, corruption and permanent subsidy to politically protected inefficiency can be moral failures because they consume resources that could serve other legitimate needs. Trade can be an expression of stewardship when specialization, scale and exchange allow scarce labor, capital and natural resources to create more value. Legitimate profit can reward entrepreneurship, investment and risk. Yet stewardship also asks what is being produced, through what means and with what foreseeable external consequences. A profitable export that depends on coercive labor, fraudulent certification or predatory extraction is not legitimized by foreign demand.

The parable of entrusted resources in [Matthew 25:14-30](#) is often invoked in discussions of stewardship, but its theological meaning should not be reduced to a promise that higher financial returns are morally superior. The relevant business principle is accountable use of what has been entrusted: resources, authority, knowledge and opportunity are exercised under responsibility, not ownership without limit.

14.24.5 Nations, authority and subsidiarity

Christian faith recognizes both human unity and the reality of political communities. [Acts 17:26](#) describes the ordering of peoples and their boundaries within divine providence, while [Romans 13:1-7](#) treats civil authority as morally accountable rather than absolute. These texts do not provide a blueprint for modern regional organizations. They do, however, caution against two errors: treating national sovereignty as an idol that forbids cooperation, and treating supranational authority as inherently superior to local or national self-government.

Subsidiarity is therefore morally and economically useful. Border problems that create genuine spillovers may require joint authority: a regional transit corridor, a customs data interface or a shared currency cannot be governed effectively by isolated decisions alone. Other choices may remain better at national or local level because knowledge, preferences and accountability are closer to the people affected. The Christian question is not “How much integration is holy?” It is “At what level can this responsibility be exercised competently, justly and accountably while respecting legitimate freedom and community?”

14.24.6 Peace, dependence and the moral ambiguity of interdependence

Trade can create repeated relationships that raise the cost of conflict and build habits of cooperation. Regional infrastructure and production networks can make neighboring economies stakeholders in one another's stability. These are real potential goods. Interdependence can also create coercive leverage when one country controls a critical mineral, energy route, payment channel, technology, market or source of food. Diversification and resilience can therefore be moral as well as economic objectives when they prevent essential human needs from becoming instruments of domination.

The appropriate response is not autarky. Self-sufficiency can be extremely costly and can expose households to local crop, climate or political shocks. Resilience is better understood as the capacity to continue essential functions under disruption through diversified sourcing, inventories, adaptable production, regional cooperation and credible institutions. A resilient system may be globally connected precisely because multiple external options reduce dependence on any single partner.

14.24.7 A disciplined Christian method for trade-policy judgment

A Scripture-informed judgment should proceed in order. Establish the facts and uncertainty. Identify the persons and communities affected. Clarify the legitimate public objective. Test the economic mechanism and alternatives. Identify duties that should not be violated even for aggregate gain, including truthfulness, non-corruption, non-coercion and respect for persons. Evaluate consequences across time and distribution, especially for those with little political voice. Examine whether authority is exercised at an appropriate level and whether decision makers are accountable. Finally, preserve humility: many trade and macroeconomic choices are prudential judgments under uncertainty, not direct biblical commands.

ETHICAL DILEMMA | Cheap food, local farmers and a temporary import shock

A government faces a harvest failure and rapidly rising food prices. Removing an import tariff could lower consumer prices but intensify pressure on domestic farmers already affected by drought. Keeping the tariff protects some farm incomes but increases the food bill of poor urban and land-poor households. A Christian analysis should not begin by declaring either “free trade” or “food sovereignty” morally absolute. It should ask which households face immediate harm, whether temporary and targeted farmer support can preserve production without taxing food consumption, whether the policy is time-bound, and whether officials can administer aid without patronage.

14.25 Professional Toolkit: The Trade and Regional Integration Stewardship (TRIS) Protocol

The TRIS Protocol converts the chapter into a repeatable professional decision process. It is designed for policy analysts, managers, regional institutions, investors and researchers evaluating a trade-policy or integration question. The protocol does not produce one correct ideology. Its purpose is to make objectives, mechanisms, evidence, distribution, macro constraints, institutional authority and moral responsibility explicit enough to be challenged.

Table 14.15. The Trade and Regional Integration Stewardship (TRIS) Protocol.

Step	Professional question	Required output / evidence
1. Target	What concrete problem or opportunity is being addressed?	A precise decision statement, baseline, affected market and legitimate objective. Avoid “increase trade” as a complete objective.
2. Real mechanism	Through which price, cost, scale, productivity, finance, exchange-rate or coordination channel should the intervention work?	Causal map showing assumptions and the counterfactual. Identify whether the problem is tariff, fixed trade cost, market failure, macro instability or institutional fragmentation.
3. Incidence	Who gains, who loses, where, when and through which prices or factor returns?	Consumer, producer, worker, taxpayer, region, firm-size and vulnerable-group incidence; distinguish short-run specific-factor losses from longer-run reallocation.

Step	Professional question	Required output / evidence
4. Alternatives	What other instruments could address the mechanism at lower economic or moral cost?	Comparison of tariffs, subsidies, infrastructure, standards cooperation, competition, adjustment support, macro policy and no-action option.
5. Domestic and regional capability	Can firms, workers and institutions respond to the opportunity?	Evidence on infrastructure, skills, finance, logistics, standards, energy, firm productivity and implementation capacity.
6. External stability	How does the option interact with the current account, capital flows, exchange rate, inflation, reserves and debt?	Open-economy stress test under plausible exchange-rate, commodity-price, financing and demand shocks.
7. Sovereignty and subsidiarity	Which level of authority is necessary and legitimate?	Map of national, regional and local decision rights; justification for harmonization, mutual recognition or retained discretion.
8. Stewardship and safeguards	Which moral boundaries and foreseeable harms must constrain the decision?	Truthfulness, dignity, anti-corruption, procedural fairness, vulnerable-household protection, environmental and intergenerational considerations where relevant.
9. Signposts and review	What evidence would show success, failure or a changed environment?	Metrics, review date, causal indicators, utilization data, sunset/exit conditions and named accountability owner.

Source/Note: Author's synthesis integrating trade theory, open-economy macroeconomics, regional-integration economics and the moral-accountability architecture of Chapter 13.

14.25.1 Applying TRIS to a proposed regional tariff preference

Suppose a regional bloc considers eliminating tariffs on processed foods while maintaining external tariffs. Step 1 clarifies whether the objective is consumer affordability, regional processing, food security or all three. Step 2 maps the mechanism: internal price reduction, scale expansion, supplier entry and possible trade diversion. Step 3 identifies consumers, domestic processors, farmers, external suppliers and tariff revenue. Step 4 compares a preference with infrastructure, standards mutual recognition or targeted capability support. Step 5 asks whether processors can meet quality and volume requirements. Step 6 examines exchange-rate and imported-input exposure. Step 7 asks what must be standardized regionally and what can remain national. Step 8 tests food safety, small-farmer treatment, corruption risk and affordability. Step 9 specifies utilization, price, entry, investment and sourcing metrics. By the end, the policy may still be chosen, but the reasoning is more transparent and contestable.

PRACTICE TOOL | The minimum defensible trade-policy memo

A professional recommendation should state: the decision; the objective; the baseline and counterfactual; the economic mechanism; quantified or bounded effects; distributional incidence; macro and fiscal risks; implementation requirements; legal questions to route to Chapter 19; moral safeguards; and review triggers. If one of these is missing, confidence should fall accordingly.

14.26 Common Misconceptions, Analytical Errors and Professional Pitfalls

International economics attracts errors that are persuasive because they compress a conditional model into a slogan. Professional analysis should identify the hidden assumption rather than merely attach the label "true" or "false." The recurring mistakes below are therefore organized by the economic mechanism they confuse, with each subsection explaining why the error matters for real decisions.

14.26.1 Comparative advantage, capability and distribution

Absolute productivity and comparative advantage answer different questions. A country that is more productive in every activity can still gain from trade because specialization depends on relative opportunity cost. The opposite mistake is to treat comparative advantage as a command to preserve today's specialization forever. Relative costs can change when education, infrastructure, management, technology and agglomeration change. The disciplined position is to use present opportunity costs as evidence while testing whether a credible learning or coordination mechanism can alter future capability.

Aggregate gains also do not imply universal gains. Trade changes prices, factor returns, firm scale and regional demand, and adjustment can be slow where skills, housing, finance or social protection restrict mobility. A national welfare gain establishes the possibility that total gains exceed total losses under a model; it does not establish that compensation occurs. Any recommendation that stops at an aggregate gain while ignoring concentrated, persistent losses is analytically incomplete and can be politically or morally irresponsible.

14.26.2 Border instruments, regulation and industrial policy

Tariff revenue is a fiscal transfer, not a free national resource gain. In the small-country benchmark, consumers finance both producer protection and government revenue while production and consumption distortions create deadweight losses. In a large-country model, a terms-of-trade gain may partly offset those losses, but retaliation and downstream input costs can reverse the result. Quotas alter who receives scarcity rents; local-content measures can build linkages or merely raise input costs; and non-tariff measures can either protect legitimate health and safety objectives or impose unnecessary trade friction. Policy instruments must be evaluated by the mechanism they actually change rather than by whether they are labeled "protection" or "liberalization."

Industrial policy is subject to two symmetrical errors. One assumes governments can never intervene intelligently; the other assumes public authority can create any desired sector by decree. Evidence supports neither extreme. Intervention can be justified by identifiable learning, coordination, innovation or strategic-resilience problems, but the case becomes credible only when additionality, state capability, competition, fiscal cost, measurable learning and exit conditions are explicit. Protection without productivity is not transformation, and a market-failure diagnosis without an implementable remedy is not a policy.

14.26.3 External balances, exchange rates and macroeconomic resilience

A current-account deficit is not synonymous with "living beyond one's means." The identity $CA = S - I$ can describe a deficit generated by productive investment just as it can describe one generated by weak saving, recurrent fiscal consumption or a commodity shock. Sustainability depends on what the financing purchases, the maturity and currency of liabilities, export capacity, reserves and the external balance sheet. The IIP and NIIP therefore complement the current account by showing the stock of foreign assets and liabilities and the valuation risks attached to them.

Currency slogans are equally dangerous. A weaker nominal exchange rate does not guarantee export competitiveness or an improved trade balance because pass-through, imported inputs, debt, contracts and quantity elasticities matter. A strong nominal currency can coexist with weak productivity if it reflects temporary capital inflows or a rigid peg. Reserves can smooth disorderly markets and defend a credible arrangement, but they are finite and cannot permanently offset inconsistent macroeconomic policies. The relevant unit of analysis is the entire monetary, fiscal and external regime, not the day's exchange-rate quote.

14.26.4 Regional integration, monetary union and sovereignty

More intra-regional trade is not, by itself, proof of successful integration. The increase may reflect trade creation, trade diversion, faster regional growth, commodity-price changes or reclassification. Welfare analysis therefore requires counterfactual evidence on prices, sourcing, productivity, entry, investment and tariff revenue. Nor are deeper institutional forms automatically superior. A common market or monetary union can reduce transaction costs, but deeper integration also pools more authority and removes adjustment instruments. Optimum-currency-area conditions, administrative capability, shock sharing and political legitimacy must be evaluated before a common currency is treated as a natural destination.

Sovereignty and integration are also not simple opposites. States can exercise sovereignty by voluntarily entering binding cooperation, just as they can misuse sovereignty to impose costs on neighbors or their own citizens. Regional harmonization can solve cross-border externalities and duplication, while mutual recognition, equivalence or retained national variation can sometimes achieve the same objective with greater subsidiarity. The correct question is which authority is necessary for the problem, how it is held accountable and which local discretion remains economically and morally valuable.

14.26.5 Evidence status, AfCFTA projections and policy claims

Finally, projections are not achievements and observed changes are not automatically causal effects. AfCFTA model results describe conditional counterfactual scenarios under assumptions about implementation, trade costs, investment and behavior. Observed growth in intra-African or intra-EAC trade documents what happened to reported trade values, but many simultaneous causes remain. A publication-quality argument labels each number as observed, estimated, modeled or forecast; states the relevant date and denominator; and avoids converting institutional aspiration into empirical conclusion. The same evidential discipline applies to claims made by supporters and critics of integration.

14.27 Chapter Synthesis and Intellectual Hand-Off to Chapter 15

International economics begins with a counterintuitive insight: absolute productivity does not determine whether exchange can be mutually beneficial. Comparative advantage identifies gains through relative opportunity cost, while factor-endowment, specific-factors, new-trade and heterogeneous-firm theories explain additional dimensions of trade patterns, distribution, scale and firm selection. Structural gravity connects these mechanisms to empirical bilateral trade costs. Together, the theories show why trade can expand real possibilities while producing concentrated adjustment that aggregate income measures can conceal.

Trade policy changes those relative prices deliberately. Tariffs, quotas, subsidies, local-content measures and non-tariff regulation redistribute as well as protect; their evaluation requires consumer, producer, fiscal, input-cost and dynamic effects. Large-country market power can create a theoretical terms-of-trade motive for intervention, while strategic-trade models show how oligopolistic rents might be shifted, but retaliation, information limits and political capture make those results conditional rather than prescriptions. Industrial policy can be defensible when it addresses learning or coordination failures, but its credibility depends on evidence, competition, state capacity, measurable additionality and exit discipline. The distinction between static and dynamic comparative advantage therefore permits ambition without suspending opportunity-cost reasoning.

The open economy adds a second layer. The current account is linked precisely to national saving and investment, while the international investment position reveals the stock of external assets and liabilities on which valuation and currency risks operate. Capital inflows can finance productive accumulation or create balance-sheet vulnerability. Exchange rates reflect goods prices, asset markets, expectations and policy. Currency regimes trade stability against adjustment flexibility, while the policy trilemma constrains the simultaneous pursuit of exchange stability, capital mobility and monetary autonomy. External shocks transmit through terms of trade, inflation, reserves, debt, asset valuations, capital flows and household purchasing power.

Regional integration brings these mechanisms together. Trade creation, trade diversion, scale, competition, factor mobility and policy coordination all matter. AfCFTA can enlarge the economic space in which African firms learn and scale, but formal liberalization does not remove real trade costs or create productive capability by decree. EAC experience shows that deeper integration can support regional production networks while leaving non-tariff, distributional and monetary challenges unresolved. Integration also reshapes institutions, migration, local bargaining power and cultural interaction, so its incidence cannot be measured by trade volume alone. The EU comparison shows both the scale benefits of deep integration and the economic costs that can arise when established low-friction relationships are reversed.

The chapter's moral conclusion is equally disciplined. Neither trade volume, national sovereignty nor supranational integration is a sufficient measure of human flourishing. Economic arrangements should be judged by truthfulness, productive stewardship, justice, dignity, subsidiarity, resilience and the distribution of foreseeable consequences. That conclusion does not replace cost-benefit analysis; it tells the analyst which human realities cost-benefit analysis must not erase.

Chapter 15 now changes the unit of analysis. Chapter 14 asked why countries trade, how policy and currencies shape the environment, and what regional integration changes. Chapter 15 asks why firms themselves cross borders, how multinational enterprises choose locations and entry modes, how they configure global and regional value chains, and how they govern subsidiaries and political risk. The country-level opportunity and constraint set developed here becomes the environment in which multinational strategy is formed.

Key Terms

Absolute advantage. The ability to produce a good with fewer inputs or greater output per unit of input than another producer.

Comparative advantage. The ability to produce a good at a lower opportunity cost than another producer.

Opportunity cost. The value or quantity of the next-best alternative forgone when a resource is used for a particular purpose.

Terms of trade. The price of exports relative to the price of imports; commonly summarized as an export-price index divided by an import-price index.

Ricardian model. A trade model in which differences in relative labor productivity generate comparative advantage.

Heckscher-Ohlin model. A trade framework linking comparative advantage to relative factor abundance and factor intensity.

Stolper-Samuelson theorem. A result linking goods-price changes to real factor returns under restrictive Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions.

Specific factors. Resources that cannot move easily between sectors over the relevant time horizon.

Increasing returns to scale. A production property under which output grows proportionately more than inputs over a relevant range.

Intra-industry trade. Simultaneous export and import of differentiated products within the same broad industry.

Grubel-Lloyd index. A descriptive index measuring the extent of two-way trade within an industry.

Firm heterogeneity. Differences among firms, especially productivity and fixed-cost capability, that generate different responses to trade opportunities.

Structural gravity. A theoretically grounded model in which bilateral trade depends on economic size and bilateral trade costs relative to all alternative trade relationships.

Multilateral resistance. The general-equilibrium trade-cost terms reflecting how difficult it is for an economy to trade with all partners, not only one bilateral partner.

Trade creation. Replacement of higher-cost domestic production with lower-cost imports from an integration partner.

Trade diversion. Replacement of lower-cost imports from a non-member by higher-cost imports from a preferred member because of discriminatory trade policy.

Tariff. A tax imposed on imported goods, usually ad valorem or specific.

Optimal tariff. A tariff rate that can maximize a large importing country's national welfare under restrictive assumptions by exploiting foreign export-supply elasticity, before retaliation and wider effects are considered.

Import quota. A quantitative limit on imports; the policy can create quota rents depending on how import rights are allocated.

Non-tariff measure. A policy measure other than an ordinary customs tariff that can affect quantities, prices or the conditions of international trade.

Local-content measure. A rule or incentive that requires or encourages a specified share of inputs, labor or value added to be sourced domestically.

Effective rate of protection. The percentage change in domestic value added caused by the tariff structure relative to value added at world prices.

Industrial policy. Public intervention intended to influence the sectoral, technological or productive structure of the economy.

Infant-industry argument. A case for temporary support when a potentially viable activity has learning or coordination failures that prevent socially desirable development.

Strategic trade policy. Intervention in an imperfectly competitive international market intended to influence strategic firm behavior or shift economic rents toward domestic producers.

Balance of payments. The double-entry statistical statement recording transactions between residents and nonresidents over a period.

Current account. The BoP component covering goods, services, primary income and secondary income.

Financial account. The BoP component recording transactions in financial assets and liabilities, including direct, portfolio, other investment and reserves.

International investment position. A point-in-time statement of residents' external financial assets and liabilities.

Net international investment position. External financial assets minus external financial liabilities at a point in time.

Current-account identity. The macroeconomic accounting relationship $CA = S - I$.

Nominal exchange rate. The price of one currency in units of another.

Real exchange rate. A nominal exchange rate adjusted for relative price levels, used as an indicator of the relative price of foreign and domestic baskets.

Real effective exchange rate. A trade-weighted real exchange-rate index across multiple partner currencies.

Purchasing power parity. A long-run benchmark linking exchange rates to relative price levels when comparable goods face limited trade frictions.

Interest parity. A relationship connecting domestic and foreign asset returns to expected or forward exchange-rate movements and, in some formulations, risk premia.

Exchange-rate pass-through. The extent to which exchange-rate changes affect domestic prices.

Exchange-rate regime. The institutional arrangement governing the degree to which a currency is fixed, managed or allowed to float.

Foreign-exchange reserves. External reserve assets held by a monetary authority for liquidity, intervention and confidence purposes.

Policy trilemma. The constraint that a country cannot fully combine a fixed exchange rate, free capital mobility and independent monetary policy.

Marshall-Lerner condition. A condition under which a real depreciation improves the trade balance if export and import demand respond sufficiently to relative prices.

J-curve. A possible time path in which the trade balance initially worsens after depreciation before improving as quantities adjust.

Free trade area. An arrangement removing internal tariffs among members while allowing each member to retain its own external tariff policy.

Customs union. A free trade area combined with a common external tariff toward non-members.

Common market. An integration arrangement combining internal goods liberalization with broader movement of productive factors such as labor and capital.

Optimum currency area. A region for which the benefits of sharing a currency are sufficiently large relative to the costs of losing independent monetary and exchange-rate adjustment.

Subsidiarity. The principle that authority should be exercised at the lowest competent level unless a higher level is needed to address spillovers or coordination problems.

Regional value chain. A production network in which multiple stages or inputs are organized across economies within a region.

Structural transformation. Long-run reallocation of resources toward activities with different productivity, capability and value-added characteristics.

Export diversification. Expansion or rebalancing of the range of products and markets in a country's export basket.

AfCFTA. The African Continental Free Trade Area, a continental framework for progressively reducing trade barriers and deepening economic integration among participating African economies.

TRIS Protocol. The Trade and Regional Integration Stewardship protocol developed in this chapter for evidence-based, distribution-aware and morally accountable analysis.

Concept-Check Questions

1. Why can two economies gain from trade even when one has an absolute advantage in both goods?
2. In a two-good model, how do you calculate the opportunity cost of one good in terms of the other?
3. What range of terms of trade can support mutual gain in the Chapter 14 comparative-advantage example?
4. How does the Heckscher-Ohlin mechanism differ from the Ricardian mechanism?
5. Why is the specific-factors model especially relevant to short-run adjustment?
6. What does the Stolper-Samuelson theorem show, and why should it not be applied mechanically to every labor market?
7. How can increasing returns generate trade between countries with similar technologies and endowments?
8. Why do fixed export costs imply that firms within the same industry respond differently to lower trade barriers?
9. What is multilateral resistance in the structural gravity model?
10. Why can a tariff generate both redistribution and deadweight loss in the small-country benchmark?
11. How do quota rents differ from tariff revenue?
12. Why can a tariff on imported intermediate inputs undermine domestic industrialization?
13. What is the current-account identity, and why does it not determine whether a deficit is good or bad?
14. Under the exchange-rate convention used in this chapter, what does an increase in E mean?
15. What is the difference between nominal depreciation and real depreciation?
16. Why does purchasing power parity work better as a long-run anchor than a short-run exchange-rate forecast?
17. What are the three objectives in the open-economy policy trilemma?
18. Under what simplified condition is a depreciation expected to improve the trade balance?
19. Distinguish trade creation from trade diversion.
20. Why is a common market economically deeper than a free trade area?
21. Name four optimum-currency-area characteristics that can reduce the cost of sharing a currency.
22. Why should AfCFTA model projections be distinguished from observed intra-African trade outcomes?
23. How can regional value chains contribute to structural transformation?
24. What does subsidiarity add to the economic analysis of regional harmonization?
25. Why can a large-country tariff have a terms-of-trade effect, and why does retaliation complicate the result?

26. When can a local-content measure build productive linkages, and when can it reduce downstream competitiveness?
27. How does the net international investment position differ from the current account, and why are both needed for external-risk analysis?
28. What are the nine steps of the TRIS Protocol?

Higher-Order Analytical and Critical-Thinking Questions

1. A country can produce every traded good with fewer labor hours than a neighbor. Explain why this does not establish that the country should produce everything itself. Then identify three real-world frictions that could nevertheless eliminate the benchmark gains from specialization.
2. Compare the distributional predictions of the specific-factors and Stolper-Samuelson models. Which is more useful for evaluating a sudden tariff reduction over the first two years, and why?
3. An African country raises the tariff on imported finished pharmaceuticals to support local manufacturing but leaves a high tariff on active pharmaceutical ingredients and laboratory equipment. Use effective-protection logic to evaluate the coherence of the policy.
4. “Non-tariff barriers should be abolished because they restrict trade more than tariffs.” Critique this statement using regulatory objectives, proportionality, mutual recognition and evidence on real trade costs.
5. Assess an infant-industry proposal for regional battery manufacturing. What evidence would persuade you that the activity has a learning externality rather than a permanent cost disadvantage?
6. Explain why a current-account deficit caused by a surge in productive private investment is economically different from an equally sized deficit caused by recurrent fiscal consumption financed through short-term foreign-currency debt.
7. An exchange rate depreciates 20% while domestic prices rise 18% and trading-partner prices rise 4%. Using the real-exchange-rate concept, reason qualitatively about how much of the nominal competitiveness change remains.
8. Why might a central bank rationally allow some exchange-rate depreciation during an external shock even when depreciation raises inflation? Under what conditions would intervention be more defensible?
9. Use the trilemma to compare the policy constraints of a small open economy with a hard peg and an economy with a flexible exchange rate and open capital markets.
10. A regional customs union increases intra-regional trade by 30%. Explain why this fact alone cannot tell you whether welfare increased. Identify the evidence needed to separate creation, diversion, scale and demand effects.
11. Compare full regulatory harmonization with mutual recognition for a regional professional-services market. When could subsidiarity favor the second approach?
12. Assess the economic case for an EAC single currency without appealing to the symbolism of integration. Which OCA and institutional conditions should carry the most weight?
13. If AfCFTA implementation attracts large plants to only three coastal hubs, should that be treated as an integration failure? Analyze efficiency, agglomeration, distribution, corridor development and political sustainability.
14. Use Autor et al. (2013) and Topalova (2010) to explain why labor mobility and place matter for trade-policy legitimacy. What kinds of adjustment policies would need separate causal evaluation?
15. “Industrial policy is simply protectionism with better branding.” Evaluate this claim by distinguishing policy rationales, instruments, governance and measurable additionality.
16. How might regional integration increase resilience to one shock while increasing exposure to another? Give an example involving food, energy, finance or transport.
17. Why is a strong currency not necessarily evidence of a strong productive economy, and why is a weak currency not necessarily evidence of export competitiveness?
18. Critically compare the European Single Market and AfCFTA as integration projects. Which economic lessons are portable, and which institutional features should not be copied mechanically?
19. If the modeled aggregate gain from an integration reform is positive but a politically marginalized region suffers large persistent job losses, how should the policy be evaluated under utilitarian, Rawlsian, capability and Christian moral perspectives?
20. A government proposes an export subsidy for a domestic aircraft-component producer because only two global suppliers dominate the market. Use strategic-trade reasoning to identify the assumptions under which rent shifting might occur, then explain what evidence on costs, foreign response, competition, fiscal exposure and learning would be required before intervention could be defended.
21. Using the TRIS Protocol, design the evidence section of a ministerial memo evaluating whether to temporarily suspend an import tariff after a major regional food-supply shock.

Applied Case Problem: The Republic of Kijani, Regional Food Processing and an External Shock

The Republic of Kijani is a fictional landlocked African economy and a member of a regional free trade area. It imports refined cooking oil from both a regional partner and the world market, while domestic firms crush oilseeds and operate small refining lines. The government wants to strengthen domestic processing, reduce exposure to external shocks and keep food affordable. A drought has reduced domestic oilseed supply, the domestic currency has depreciated and fertilizer prices have risen. The cabinet is considering a package that combines a higher external tariff on refined oil, a production subsidy for domestic refiners and accelerated tariff removal for qualifying regional imports.

Table 14.16. Kijani case data.

Variable	Baseline / proposal
World-market price of refined oil	US\$1,000 per tonne

Variable	Baseline / proposal
Regional partner resource cost	US\$1,060 per tonne
Domestic refinery unit cost before policy	US\$1,180 per tonne
Current external tariff on refined oil	10%
Proposed external tariff on refined oil	25%
Tariff on imported refining inputs/equipment	12% average effective input burden
Regional preference	0% tariff for qualifying regional oil
Annual refined-oil demand at baseline price	120,000 tonnes
Domestic production at baseline	30,000 tonnes
Domestic currency per US dollar	1,000 before shock; 1,180 after shock
Current account	-4.5% of GDP
Official reserves	4.1 months of imports before shock; 3.4 months after intervention
Household food-budget share, bottom income quintile	48%
Government proposed refinery subsidy	US\$90 per tonne for three years, conditional on productivity milestones

Source/Note: Fictional teaching case created for Chapter 14. All values are illustrative and do not represent any actual country.

Required analysis. Prepare a 1,200-1,800 word policy memorandum using the TRIS Protocol. At minimum, calculate the tariff-inclusive pre-policy world import price and the post-policy world import price; compare both with the duty-free regional supplier; identify whether the preference can create trade diversion; explain how the 18% currency depreciation changes the domestic-currency cost of all imported options; discuss whether the production subsidy targets the learning objective more directly than the tariff; analyze household distribution, imported-input protection and current-account/reserve risks; and recommend measurable three-year review criteria. Route any legal questions about origin or trade-remedy compatibility to Chapter 19 rather than attempting to resolve them here.

Ethical and Faith-Informed Dilemma: The Factory, the Tariff and the Households Who Pay

A domestic textile factory employs 4,500 workers in a town with few alternative formal jobs. Management tells government that a planned tariff reduction under a regional agreement will cause the plant to close unless a 30% protective tariff is retained for five years. Independent analysis finds that the factory is less productive than regional competitors and has received protection for twelve years, but a new management team has proposed credible energy and equipment upgrades. The tariff would raise school-uniform prices by an estimated 12%, affecting millions of households, and would also raise garment input costs for smaller downstream firms. The town has weak social protection and limited worker mobility.

Write a reasoned decision that explicitly separates economic evidence from moral judgment. Address the credibility of the learning claim, the distribution of tariff costs, duties to existing workers and to consumers, whether a production or transition subsidy would be more targeted, corruption and lobbying risk, the principle of subsidiarity, and the conditions under which protection should end. Engage Christian principles of truth, dignity, neighbor-love, stewardship and justice alongside at least two alternative ethical frameworks. A satisfactory answer must avoid both the claim that every existing job must be preserved regardless of cost and the claim that aggregate consumer gain makes concentrated community loss morally irrelevant.

Data and Evidence Exercise: Trade Growth, Exchange Rates and the Status of Claims

Table 14.17. Evidence set for analysis.

Indicator	Earlier value	Later / forecast value	Source status
Intra-African trade value	US\$196.04bn (2023)	US\$220.3bn (2024)	Afreximbank estimate based on trade data; observed historical period, not an AfCFTA causal estimate.
Intra-EAC trade	US\$14.2bn (June 2024 comparison)	US\$18.0bn (June 2025 comparison)	EAC Secretariat institutional reporting.
World merchandise trade volume growth	4.6% (2025)	1.9% baseline (2026)	WTO: 2025 estimate/historical outcome versus 2026 projection; forecast subject to major geopolitical risk.
World services trade volume growth	5.3% (2025)	4.8% baseline (2026)	WTO: 2025 estimate/historical outcome versus 2026 projection.
Illustrative domestic exchange rate	1,250 local/US\$	1,425 local/US\$	Teaching series for calculation only.

Sources/Notes: African Export-Import Bank (2025); East African Community (2026); WTO (2026). Exchange-rate row is fictional.

1. Calculate the percentage growth in intra-African trade from 2023 to 2024. Compare your result with Afreximbank's reported 12.4% and explain any small difference caused by rounding.
2. Calculate the percentage increase from US\$14.2 billion to US\$18.0 billion. Explain why matching the EAC-reported 27% does not establish a causal effect of integration.
3. Calculate the percentage slowdown in the WTO merchandise trade growth rate from 4.6% to 1.9%. Distinguish the change in a growth rate from a contraction in trade volume.

4. Classify each number in the table as observed/estimated historical data, institutional reporting, forecast or fictional teaching data. Explain why the evidential status changes how the number may be used in a policy argument.
5. Calculate the percentage depreciation when the exchange rate moves from 1,250 to 1,425 local currency units per US dollar under the chapter convention.
6. Assume domestic inflation over the same period is 9% and partner-country inflation is 3%. Use the approximation for real depreciation to reason whether the real exchange rate depreciated by more or less than the nominal rate.
7. Write a 250-word evidence note that states what can and cannot be concluded about African regional integration from the first two rows alone.

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Annotated Further Reading

- Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).** A foundational structural-gravity treatment. Read it to understand why bilateral trade cannot be interpreted correctly without accounting for each economy's resistance to all other trading partners.
- Melitz (2003).** The classic heterogeneous-firm model that explains why trade liberalization changes which firms export, expand or exit. Especially useful for linking country-level trade policy with within-industry productivity reallocation.
- Juhász, Lane, and Rodrik (2024).** A rigorous modern review of industrial policy. Particularly valuable because it treats market failures, state capability, information, implementation and evaluation as empirical questions rather than ideological slogans.
- Echandi, Maliszewska, and Steenbergen (2022).** The World Bank's detailed modeling of AfCFTA implementation, including trade, investment, income, employment and distributional scenarios. Read its assumptions carefully before citing headline gains.
- UNCTAD (2025).** An Africa-centered account of trade structure, non-tariff measures, logistics and regional value chains. Useful for seeing why tariff preferences alone do not create a continental market.
- Stack, Amissah, and Bliss (2024).** Peer-reviewed structural-gravity evidence on African integration. Useful for separating aggregate integration effects from the heterogeneous performance of particular regional arrangements.
- Krantz (2025).** A detailed empirical study of global and regional integration patterns in the East African Community, including sectoral value-chain structure and the role of Kenya as a regional manufacturing supplier.
- IMF (2025).** The seventh-edition international-accounts framework used to distinguish balance-of-payments flows from the international investment position and valuation effects. Particularly useful for precise external-sector definitions.
- IMF (2026).** A current open-economy macroeconomic assessment of Sub-Saharan Africa. Best used for shock transmission, inflation, debt and policy-space context, with attention to the report's forecast vintage.
- WTO (2026).** A current baseline for world merchandise and services trade. Its forecasts are useful precisely when treated as conditional projections rather than certainties, especially under geopolitical and commodity-price shocks.